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ABSTRACT 
 
 In past periods of economic struggle the US Government has instituted job 
creation programs that supported, in part, employment for artists and cultural 
organizations. These programs - the Works Progress Administration in the 1930s, the 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973, and most recently the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 - all made funds available to support jobs in the 
arts and cultural sector. This study compares all three programs, examining differences 
and similarities in their structures, and the subsequent outcomes of each. The paper 
concludes with recommendations for future policies, which consists of including the arts 
in the legislation and reporting requirements, and other of points to considering 
regarding the structure of the overall program, eligibility requirements, limitations on 
wages and other expenses, and the duration of support.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
During the last century the American economy fluctuated greatly. There were 
periods of prosperity and times of great struggles. In several periods of decline, the 
federal government created programs to combat high levels of unemployment that 
were a result of these economic hardships. Three of these programs, the Works 
Progress Administration in the 1930s, the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act 
of 1973, and most recently the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, are 
unique in the fact that they all made funds available to support jobs in the arts and 
cultural sector.  
America is still in a period of recovery from its most recent recession, which 
began in 2008. While the unemployment rate is beginning to rise and the economy is 
improving a level of uncertainty still exists. No matter how much things improve in the 
coming months and years the economy is always at risk. Should America experience 
another economic or employment crisis, legislators may find it necessary to enact 
another job support or stimulus program that includes provisions for the arts industry.  
This study examines the Federal One Arts Projects of the Works Progress 
Administration (WPA), the arts related jobs supported by the Comprehensive 
Employment and Training Act (CETA), and those that were supported via an allocation of 
funds from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) to the National 
Endowment for the Arts (NEA). The purpose of this study is to examine the structure of 
federal programs that supported jobs in the arts to help inform future federal job 
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support programs. The study takes a comparative look at all three programs to examine 
their differences and similarities in structure and their subsequent outcomes.  
Studying previous programs that supported jobs in the arts and cultural industry 
uncovers the strengths and weaknesses of each program. This study does not attempt 
to rank one program over another, but simply evaluates differences and similarities 
among the three. All three programs were structured differently and therefore resulted 
in different outcomes from which much can be learned. These learnings from the WPA, 
CETA, and ARRA will be used to provide a list of recommended elements to include and 
consider in future policies.  
This paper addresses two main questions in order to generate 
recommendations for future policies: what can be learned from these past programs to 
inform future policy, potentially maximizing the number of jobs in the arts supported; 
and, what are the most important elements to consider when constructing policy? The 
study looks at the way each program was structured, as well as how it was funded, how 
it provided support for workers, and the kinds of regulations governing its 
implementation. In an effort to evaluate the outcomes of each program this study also 
takes into consideration the number of jobs in the arts that were supported by each 
program and the portion of each program’s overall budget dedicated to arts related 
activities.  
The majority of the data and information for this study comes from existing 
research and literature on each of the three programs, as well as datasets containing 
information on the number of jobs supported and budget levels. The legislation for each 
program was also studied in order to provide details that were not included elsewhere. 
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 While volumes have been written on the WPA, a significant amount exists on 
CETA, and some literature is beginning to emerge on ARRA. Minimal research has been 
conducted comparing WPA and CETA to each other, but the majority of what exists was 
created in the early days of CETA and focuses on a desire to bring back a program 
structured similarly to the WPA (Barnes 1975; Dubin 1987). In what has been written on 
ARRA, there appears to be a similar interest in resurrecting the WPA, but there is little 
mention of CETA (Grunwald 2012; Williams 2009). Research on these programs did not 
uncover any studies that included all three. This study may be one of the first, or among 
the few, that examines the differences and similarities in the structures and outcomes 
of the WPA, CETA, and ARRA.  
Much of the research that exists on the arts portions WPA and CETA focuses on 
artistic gains rather than the number of jobs created. The unemployment level tends to 
be one of the most talked about issues in today’s news; it is very rare for concern to be 
presented on the type of work people are involved in. This study fills this void by 
primarily focusing on the relief aspect of these programs rather than the artistry. This is 
not to say that the artistic achievements are not important, it is just not the most 
important message for the current economic and political climate.  
This study first provides detailed information on the background, structure, and 
outcomes of each of the three programs. The main differences and similarities are then 
discussed and evaluated. Finally, lists of recommended of elements to be included in 
future policies and other points that would need to be considered before implementing 
legislation are presented.  
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WORKS PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION 
 
 
The United States’ first major foray into federally funding the arts came during 
the Great Depression. President Roosevelt’s top priority during his first administration 
was to combat massive unemployment. As part of the New Deal, the Federal One Arts 
Projects was created under the auspice of the Works Progress Administration to provide 
employment for out-of-work artists. The Federal One Arts Projects contained five 
separate discipline-specific sub-projects: Federal Theatre Project, Art Project, Music 
Project, Writers Project, and the Historical Records Survey. Federal One was established 
through Executive Order Number 7034 and funding was provided by The Emergency 
Relief Appropriation Act of 1935 (ERA). The intention was to put people back to work 
doing the work that they were trained to do, not necessarily to “subsidize creativity” 
(Zeigler 1994).  
The Federal One projects were successful in achieving their goal of providing 
work for many artists and others in the cultural field from 1935 to 1939, at which time 
the Emergency Relief Act of 1939 called for the end of federal support to Federal One 
and the immediate dissolution of the Federal Theatre Project due to accusations of 
Communist connections and propaganda. Although federal funds for the four remaining 
Art Projects were cut, they remained in existence in several states until 1943, creating 
what some consider to be “a whole generation of creative people sustained by the 
WPA” (Zeigler 1994). 
The economic boom of the 1920s was predicted by many to continue on into 
the new decade, but the great successes of the stock market lay the groundwork for the 
collapse, the bull market allowed for scam artists to go undetected and man were 
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focused on “get rich quick schemes” (Quinn 2008). But then October 4, 1929, “Black 
Thursday,” took America by surprise. Within a matter of months the economy was 
flipped upside-down. Shortly after the stock market crashed the banks closed; not long 
after that employers were laying off workers left and right. For the three years following 
Black Thursday, companies laid off an average of 20,000 employees every weekday 
(Meltzer 1967). In many cities the unemployment rate was as high as 30 or 50% (Meltzer 
1967).  Hundreds of thousands of businesses failed. By 1931 over 7 million people were 
out of work, and that number was continuing to grow (Meltzer 1967).  
Following the crash of the stock-market in 1929 and the subsequent depression, 
there was a great deal of debate in Washington on how to aid the growing number of 
desperate people. By 1931, many, including President Hoover, insisted that it was not 
the government’s responsibility to provide relief but private charities were capable of 
solving the problem. Hoover once quoted President Cleveland stating that, “though 
people support the government, the government should not support the people” 
(Quinn 2008). Hoover approved of the idea of providing government loans, which he 
saw as promoting self-help, but did not support the idea of direct aid as he felt it would 
lead to an “abyss of reliance in the future upon government charity” (Quinn 2008). 
By the time of the presidential election in 1932 the desperation had hit a fever 
pitch and America seemed almost on the brink of revolution. All across the country 
starving people were rioting in grocery stores and stealing food just so their families 
could survive. Along the campaign trail President Hoover found himself frequently 
greeted by angry mobs. Many felt as though President Hoover was out of touch. 
Hoover’s opponent, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, knew that in order to become President, 
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and be successful, he needed to devise a plan to rescue America from the worst 
depression in history.  He was told that if he succeeded, he would be the greatest 
President and if he failed he would be the worst, to which he replied, “If I fail... I shall be 
the last one” (Quinn 2008). As the election drew near and the opposition to Hoover 
increased, Roosevelt found himself carrying all but six states (Quinn 2008).  
Franklin Roosevelt was elected the 32nd President of the United States on 
November 8, 1932. Shortly before his inauguration on March 4, 1933 the United States 
sank into the deepest lows of the Depression after a run on the banks caused the 
banking system to collapse practically overnight (Meltzer 1976). Knowing that the 
country was in dire straits, Roosevelt acted quickly to try and turn the economy around. 
Only a few months after he was elected, Roosevelt urged Congress to repeal Prohibition, 
place regulations on Wall Street, and build in new protections for bank depositors. 
Additionally, he wanted to see a new federal system enacted that would bolster relief 
efforts through the local level; this resulted in the Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration (FERA) (Quinn 2008). All of these bills were signed into law within the 
first one-hundred days of Roosevelt’s presidency.  
FERA was given an initial allocation of $500 million and was the first federal 
program of its kind: a grant-in-aid program that provided states with grants to provide 
relief for those out of work (McDonald 1969). At its core, FERA had three main 
programs: direct relief, work relief, and special programs. However, one of the main 
focuses of the program was to replace as much direct relief with work relief as possible 
by creating diverse employment opportunities. The work relief projects were housed 
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under the Civil Works Administration (CWA), an off-shoot of FERA, which also provided 
relief in the form of food and living allowances (Quinn 2008).   
In an attempt to diversify projects, “FERA directly encouraged three types of 
projects: federal projects, women’s projects, and white-collar projects. None of these 
programs had progressed far before the inception of the CWA, but their earlier 
beginning presaged more substantial development later” (McDonald 1969: 38). In the 
beginning, the white-collar projects were rejected by many, mainly because of their high 
costs. These projects by nature were smaller and hired fewer people than other projects 
that required manual labor. As a result, these smaller projects also required more 
supervisory level employees that were more expensive than the average worker. Many 
favored manual labor projects because their work resulted in tangible products, which 
was not always the case with the white-collar workers. Some even felt that the “non-
material” nature of white-collar workers’ efforts were merely a luxury (McDonald 1969). 
Despite the objections of some, the inclusion of the white-collar projects were 
successful in providing work for those in need and laid the ground work for FERA and 
the CWA for the first time to truly create and support jobs for arts and cultural workers.  
Prior to CWA, relief projects that were developed specifically for employing 
artists, musicians, actors, dancers, or writers were extremely rare and were locally 
administered and funded (McDonald 1969). In December 1933, the Public Works of 
Art Project (PWAP) was established; this was the first major federal program to 
support artists. The PWAP provided the Treasury Department’s Procurement Division 
with a grant from the CWA to employ artists and craftsmen with the purpose of 
decorating and embellishing public buildings. The goal was to employ 3,300 men and 
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women at an estimated cost of just over $1 million. Criticisms towards PWAP started 
early on, the majority of which were focused on the fact that talent and ability as an 
artist was the main criteria for employment rather than need. The federal government 
was seen as subsidizing wealthy artists rather than providing aid to hungry ones. 
Regardless of the criticisms, PWAP set a precedent for federal support of artists. By 
the time that PWAP ended in 1935, it had provided jobs for nearly 3,750 people who 
created 15,663 works of art “ranging from sculpture, murals, oils and mosaics to craft 
articles, Navajo blankets, portraits, and stage sets” (McDonald 1969). The total cost for 
the project was $1.3 million, 90% of which went to artists’ wages.   
 Only a year and half after Roosevelt took up residence in the White House, the 
economy was beginning to improve. Unemployment had decreased by over two million 
and the national income had increased by nearly 25%, or $9 billion. There was a slate of 
new legislation on its way that would provide security for homeowners, farmers and 
senior citizen as well as implement new labor standards and enforce new oversight for 
financial institutions (Quinn 2008). As a result, FERA is considered to be among the most 
important pieces of legislation that was enacted during this time (Quinn 2008).  
However, by 1935, eight years into the Depression, eight million Americans 
were still without jobs (Meltzer 1976). At the urging of Harry Hopkins, the Director of 
FERA and one of Roosevelt’s closest advisors, it was decided that the federal 
government should focus its attention on work relief. As a result, the Work Progress 
Administration (WPA) replaced FERA in April, 1935 through Executive Order Number 
7034. In doing so, the grant-in-aid system of FERA was abandoned and the WPA was 
given the authority to control all operations from the bottom up. In fact, every person 
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that was employed by the WPA became an employee of the federal government. This 
new $5 billion program acted “like a separate economic system that ran parallel to the 
regular one” (Meltzer 1976). Essentially, if a worker was unable to find employment in 
the private economy the WPA was open to them. The WPA hired everyone from ditch 
diggers to lawyers and carpenters to accountants (Meltzer 1976).  
The WPA was designed to allocate money promptly and according to need. It 
prioritized wages over large capital costs. Larger capital projects, such as building 
tunnels and dams, were managed by the Public Works Administration (PWA). The WPA, 
on the other hand, took on smaller, more “nimble” projects (Quinn 2008).  The primary 
goal of the WPA was to put people back to work, doing jobs that they were trained to 
do, in order to spread wealth and opportunity more broadly than other relief programs 
had in the past. At the time, the WPA was the “most expensive program ever launched 
by any government anywhere in the world” (Quinn 2008). No longer was the focus to 
just keep people alive, but rather to have them do meaningful work while earning a 
living. 
As mentioned before, the PWAP was dissolved along with FERA in 1935 but it 
had established a precedent for work relief programs focused on the arts. It was quickly 
realized that with the volume of artists of all genres and disciplines out of work a 
program focused on just visual artists, as PWAP had, could not exist without similar 
programs for other artists including musicians, dancers, actors, and writers (McDonald 
1969). In 1935, just as the government was transitioning out of FERA and into the WPA, 
approximately 11% of the 4,986,000 workers on federal, state, or local relief rolls 
belonged to the white-collar class. “Of the more than half-million white collar workers 
on relief, 82,100, or approximately 15% belonged to the professional and technical 
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groups… Of those employed in the arts, actors numbered 3,709; artists, sculptors, and 
teachers of art, 2,900; and musicians and teachers of music, 14,922. This last class 
comprised almost one-fifth of the professional and technical workers on relief” 
(McDonald 1969).  
In August of 1935, only a few months after WPA was established, Harry Hopkins 
announced “the most daring of all WPA gambits:” Federal Project Number One (Federal 
One) (Quinn 2008). This newly established arts-centric, white-collar program of the WPA 
was developed with four discipline specific sub-projects: The Federal Art Project, The 
Federal Music Project, The Federal Theatre Project, and The Federal Writers Project. A 
fifth project, the Historical Records Survey grew out of the Writers Project. Federal One 
was the first of only six white-collar programs of the WPA that came to fruition 
(McDonald 1969). 
One of the biggest problems the WPA faced was developing an effective 
structure for the arts projects. Harry Hopkins served as the director of the WPA, while 
Jacob Baker was the chief of the WPA’s White-Collar Division, under which Federal One 
was housed. Baker officially announced the Federal One projects in August of 1935. 
However, Federal One was not formally approved by President Roosevelt until 
September, at which time Hopkins announced that this project would replace all existing 
state and local arts projects by transferring them to the Federal Government. There was 
no precedent for this type sudden change from local to federal sponsorship of projects 
and therefore the new policies and procedures were created hastily (McDonald 1969).  
Hopkins and Baker assigned each of the individual projects a director at the 
federal level to oversee operations: Holger Cahill for the Art Project, Nicoli Sokoloff for 
the Music Project, Hallie Flanagan for the Theatre Project, and Henry Alsberg for the 
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Writers Project, who were given the collective nickname of “The Big Four”(Meltzer 
1976). Together, Hopkins, Baker, and The Big Four spent the first few months planning 
and preparing each of the four initial projects of Federal One. They all had the shared 
hope that Federal One could “ultimately employ between twenty and thirty thousand” 
out-of-work artist, musicians, actors and writers (Quinn 2008). Within just a few short 
months, the WPA “had more than 38,000 [artists] engaged in programs designed for 
[their] needs and capacities. Out of the $5 billion Congress allotted for emergency relief, 
$27 million was funneled” into the projects of Federal One (Meltzer 1976). 
The structure of Federal One was rather complex and “based the principle of 
decentralization by specialty” (McDonald 1969). Underneath the federal directors for 
each discipline specific project there were three additional hierarchical levels: regional, 
state, and district.  The federal directors were given the authority to appoint the 
directors for the regional and state levels and the district supervisors, these appointees 
were considered to be delegated representatives of the federal directors (McDonald 
1969). As with the rest of the WPA, the officers at all four levels were assisted by as 
staff. The only difference in this structure was in the Writers Project, which omitted the 
position of the regional director, making it more similar to the structure of the rest of 
the WPA. The Writers Project replaced the regional director with field representatives 
who were directly “attached” to the federal office (McDonald 1969). The hope was that 
this structure would, “reverse the established trend – the centralization of artists in a 
few metropolitan centers. The goal was to make arts the possession of people 
everywhere” (Meltzer 1976).   
District supervisors for each of the five Federal One Projects were responsible 
for the management of individual projects in their locality, referred to as “project units,” 
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and the hiring of all personnel (McDonald 1969). Employment in a project unit involved 
a referral process with the local employment office of the United States Employment 
Service (USES) and the district supervisor for the Project.  All those seeking relief from 
the WPA were required to register with the USES (McDonald 1969). Traditionally, the 
USES was responsible for interviewing, registering and classifying all certified persons. 
Registration with the USES was required in order to provide a list of names for referrals 
to private employers and the PWA, “both of which enjoyed priority over the WPA” 
(McDonald 1969). Should a relief worker employed by the WPA be requested by a 
private employer or the PWA it was mandatory that he or she quit their position with 
the WPA and accept the other offer.  
Each person on the USES registry was given one of four classifications: 
professional or technical, skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled. Classifications were not 
determined by any tests or examinations but through a series of forms completed by 
the worker and personal interviews with USES staff regarding education and prior 
experiences. However, the classification of workers essentially rested on their personal 
testimony of their skills and abilities. One of the main criticisms of this, especially in 
regards to Federal One and other white-collar or professional programs, was that it was 
far too easy for someone to lie about his or her qualifications or talents and USES staff 
were frequently misled (McDonald 1969). These levels and methods of classification 
were much more helpful for the manual labor projects but proved to be relatively 
“useless” for the professional programs (McDonald 1969). 
After conferring with the local USES office, a Federal One district supervisor 
would request to interview all those registrants who appeared to have the necessary 
skills (McDonald 1969). These individuals would then either be interviewed by the 
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district supervisor directly, or a committee that had been designated in his or her stead, 
to measure the candidates on their talents and merits. The USES was responsible for the 
initial assignment of a worker, but Federal One district supervisors were also granted 
the authority to assign a salary classification to potential workers: professional, skilled, 
intermediate, or unskilled.   
The ability to reassign and reclassify workers benefited Federal One more than it 
did other projects. Federal One officials had two sources to draw talented workers from. 
First, they could request workers from the USES relief registries by the needed skill: 
pianists, actors, sculptors, etcetera. Often times artists would not be classified as such 
with the USES because at the time of their registration there were no open positions for 
them where they were located. This lowered the frequency in which a worker might be 
referred to Federal One by the USES.  Officials also had the ability to filter through the 
WPA labor management files to find workers that were already assigned to a job 
classification who fit the desired criteria and had the talents necessary to employ them 
in Federal One. Additionally, any workers that were transferred from a state’s ERA 
program to the WPA were considered to be already assigned to the WPA and were also 
eligible for reassignment or reclassification under the WPA. This meant that the WPA 
could have workers transferred from a state’s ERA art program or project to a Federal 
One project in that state; this could happen at an individual level or in mass for an entire 
existing ERA project. Surprisingly, even with all of the bureaucracy involved, large mass 
transfers of an ERA project to a WPA project were often times the easiest way for 
Federal One officials to find the talented laborers they desired (McDonald 1969). 
Qualifications for placement on the relief rolls varied from locality to locality, 
and were much more difficult in some areas than in others. Researcher and author 
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Milton Meltzer, who worked as a writer for the Federal Theatre Project, recounts his 
struggles with qualifying and staying on the USES roster in New York City:  
The Home Relief Bureau put applicants through a stiff investigation. Did 
I have any property – a home, car, oil well, gold mine, shoe store, 
stocks, bonds? Did anyone in my family have property? Did I have any 
money stashed in my mattress or in a savings account? Did I have 
insurance that could be cashed in? The relief investigator asked a million 
questions and took my word for nothing. He checked up on all my 
answers. Once I was put on relief rolls, the probing didn’t stop. 
Investigators could drop into my dingy room without notice and look in 
the icebox or the cupboard to see if I had any extra food stored away. 
The closet was ransacked to see if there was more clothing in it than my 
relief payment could afford. My neighbors were drawn into the 
investigation. Did my coming and goings indicate that I might have a 
secret job? Was I living too high off the hog for a reliefer? Was a brother 
or mother in sight who might be able to support me? (Meltzer 1976).  
Since providing work for those in need was the primary concern of the WPA, 
and not the actual work that they performed, it was not always easy to disqualify 
someone for a particular position in Federal One because the worker essentially had the 
freedom to claim that the project be designed in a way to suit him or her (McDonald 
1969). As mentioned earlier, classification generally depended on what the worker told 
the USES staff. Therefore, someone could claim to be a cello player when in reality they 
had had only one year of lessons as a child (McDonald 1969). To the best of their ability, 
Federal One officials tried to emphasize projects over project workers and did their best 
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to “weed out” those who were less talented or skilled. Generally, this was done through 
a process of reassignment to another non-arts related WPA project or on rare occasion 
dismissal from the WPA altogether (McDonald 1969).  
Once a district supervisor was able to determine the qualifications of the eligible 
workers and the “needs and desires of the [local] community” it was then his or her 
responsibility to decide on the exact nature of the project units (McDonald 1969). More 
often than not, the projects were developed around the talent that was available rather 
than seeking out talent to fulfill the needs of a particular project or production. 
One of the biggest internal struggles of the WPA was the need to balance the 
artistic needs of a project unit with the relief needs of individuals. Federal One 
administrators were often faced with the question of whether or not they should hire 
someone who was more financially stable but a more talented artist versus someone 
who was in need of more assistance but was less skilled.  As a result, Federal One was 
given a special dispensation to employ up to 10% of non-relief workers who were “hired 
for artistic rather than relief considerations” to fill skilled and supervisory positions 
should adequate talent not be found on the local relief rolls (Levy 1997). After 
discovering that in some localities the relief rolls were too small to engage in any 
legitimate arts projects, the federal directors and their regional counterparts petitioned 
for an exemption from the 10% rule. One was granted by Administrative Order No. 35 
that allowed for the Theatre, Art, Music and Writing Projects a maximum of 25% of 
employees on a project to be non-relief workers. However, the national average of no-
relief personnel on Federal One remained well below 10% for the duration of the 
program (McDonald 1969). 
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Most all WPA workers, artists included, were required to follow the same strict 
rules that did not always work well for the creative process. Many artists found 
themselves in a position where they had to clock-in and out for the time that they 
worked on a painting or sculpture for a set time period, generally from 9:00am to 
5:00pm. These artists were also often required to work in a designated space with 
supervision to account for their activities. On average, each worker was required to put 
in ninety hours of work each month. The amount of work created by the artist and the 
timeframe in which he or she completed it was also subject to regulation: “three weeks 
was the allotted time for a watercolor or gouache, and, depending on the size, four to 
six weeks for an oil” (Meltzer 1976). However, it was very rare that the subject or style 
of these works of art be dictated to the artists; they were, at least, granted that 
freedom. These requirements were by no means outrageous for most other types of 
workers, but many artists found it difficult to adapt their methods and processes to 
these traditional work schedules that were designed for more typical WPA programs.     
The next step in the process was for the district supervisor to seek approval for 
his or her chosen project units from the State Director. From there it was then sent to 
either the Regional Director or the Federal Director for final approval. It was at this point 
that an allocation of funds was made by the WPA Administration (outside of and above 
the Federal Director of the Project) and given to the District for each of the project units 
along with stipulations on how it could be spent. The WPA Administration also reserved 
the power to discontinue any project unit at any time, and the channels below had very 
little authority to object.  
Approved and operational project units were under the supervision of the 
District Supervisors who then reported “first to the field representatives and, through 
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them, to the federal directors” (McDonald 1969). Essentially, outside of the approval 
process the State and Regional Directors had very little authority over a project unit and 
the majority of the authority resided in the District Supervisor, the Federal Director, or 
the WPA Administrators. 
The funding for, and essentially the existence of, the WPA was dependent upon 
congressional allocations, as is every other federal agency. Ultimately, “Congress was 
responsible for the inception, continuance, and final liquidation of the program” 
(McDonald 1976). However, the WPA was considerably different than most other 
federal agencies in that it was formed out of a combination of executive order and a 
series of appropriation acts rather than one particular piece of legislation. Instead, 
considerations for the WPA’s funding were presented to and decided upon by the 
appropriations committees of both the House and the Senate. The Federal Directors all 
of the WPA projects, not just those related to the arts, requested their funding directly 
from the President. For each allocation to the WPA the President would then make an 
initial determination of the amount needed and send his recommendation to Congress. 
The appropriations committee then made the decision on whether or not the 
appropriation would be granted, and these decisions were always final. Never did 
Congress increase or decrease a proposed appropriation to the WPA. During the course 
of the WPA, 97.6% of the total amount of money recommended by the President was 
granted (McDonald 1969).  
Federal One was sponsored solely by the WPA, and therefore allocations for its 
funding followed suit. President Roosevelt himself, with support from various advisors, 
requested the appropriations for the WPA and from that amount the allocation that 
Federal One would receive.  Federal One’s allocation was made “en bloc, broken down 
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only with reference to constituent projects – not by states and designed to cover a 
variable period of time” ranging from three to six months, occasionally less (McDonald 
1969). Not receiving regular allocations on an annual or semi-annual basis made Federal 
One vulnerable; this meant that the program could easily be cut at any time at the 
discretion of the President. Many of the budget problems that Federal One faced may 
have also been a result of this unstructured, periodic allocation process. It was difficult 
for directors and officials to plan too far into the future because they were never sure 
how much funding they would receive in the next allocation and how long it would last. 
All projects of the WPA were required to have an official governmental sponsor 
at either the federal, state, or local level that was an authorized government agency. 
These sponsors were intended to provide a plan for those employed through the 
program and how to employ those on the relief rolls; several WPA projects had 
additional co-sponsors that often provided supervision to the project but not any 
additional monetary support. The WPA served as the official sponsor of Federal One, 
mainly because at the time there was no other federal agency qualified to oversee an 
arts program.  Since Federal One lacked other sponsorship, the WPA was responsible for 
covering all relief wages and all other supplemental and non-labor expenses that might 
have otherwise been covered by a sponsor (McDonald 1969). Non-labor costs tended to 
be small a concern with most of the WPA projects, however these were considerably 
higher for the white-collar projects, and more specifically Federal One. Without 
providing support for non-labor expenses it would have been difficult to employ artists 
to do the work they were trained to do, the impetus behind Federal One. In order to 
allow for non-governmental agencies including “public or quasi-public agency, or a 
private non-profit organization”  to provide support for the Federal One projects, which 
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many felt was important,  the idea of “co-operating sponsors” was developed 
 (McDonald 1969).  
These local co-operating sponsors worked with the District Supervisors of the 
Art, Music, Theatre and Writing programs in order to create appropriate projects “for 
which proper talent is available from the relief rolls” and were also encouraged to 
contribute to the project financially (McDonald 1969). While the WPA was required to 
pay wages for all certified employees, it was hoped that these co-operating sponsors 
would be able to defray the costs for other things such as travel and space rental as well 
as covering some of the wages for non-certified employees (McDonald 1969).  
As beneficial as the co-operating sponsorships were in some instances, they 
were also very suspicious to the Administration. There was concern that co-operating 
sponsors would attempt to try and gain some control over the projects as a form of 
reciprocity for their assistance. This is one of the biggest contributing factors as to why 
co-operating sponsorships were not required for the Federal One projects; “local 
support was welcome only if it could be divorced from local responsibility” (McDonald 
1969).  
In an interesting interpretation of co-operating sponsorship, the admission 
funds received by the Music and Theatre projects were considered to be sponsors’ 
contributions. This meant that the audience of a concert or play could be considered a 
co-operating sponsor, even though it did not fully fit the definition as a “public or quasi-
public agency, or a private non-profit organization (McDonald 1969). There was no 
contractual relationship between a production and its audience. However, the revenue 
received from admissions was used by the project to cover overhead expenses such as 
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materials, supplies, and non-certified personnel wages, in much the same way as a more 
traditional co-operating sponsors’ contribution. Admission funds were treated in this 
way to prevent the money from flowing into the miscellaneous receipts of the Treasury 
so that the Music and Theatre projects could retain jurisdiction over the funds 
(McDonald 1969).  
During the time in which the Federal One projects were in operation, the 
Theatre Project and the Music Project brought in a combined total of over $2.6 million 
in revenue, 80% of which came from the Theatre Project (McDonald 1969). However, 
the Theatre and Music project received a fair amount of pushback from within the arts 
industry over the fact that they could charge admission for their performances. By law 
these admission prices were to be kept very low, normally around thirty cents, and 
many others were free. This free and low-cost admission helped the WPA meet another 
goal of the Federal One by making art more accessible. The problem was that non-
government sponsored theatre and musical organizations could not compete with these 
low prices and saw the Arts Projects as an undue burden on them during uncertain 
times. In this pre-NEA era, Federal support of certain arts organizations appeared to 
some more as “seed money” rather than relief for the unemployed (Levy 1997). 
While it was hoped that the Federal One projects could become self-supporting 
from the admission revenue alone they never came close, and were not even able to 
cover all of the non-labor or relief expenses. However, they were able to cover a little 
less than 5% of all the Theatre Project’s total expenses and 1% of the Music Project’s 
(McDonald 1969). Both projects needed to bring on additional personnel to handle all of 
the cash and other clerical duties to account for the expenditures. For both the Theatre 
and Music Projects the number of business managers, cashiers and box office treasurers 
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numbered around 400 to 500 and their salaries were quite possibly equal to the $2.6 
million in revenue that they were hired to manage (McDonald 1969).  
Almost all of the WPA’s expenses went towards wages for the employees. One 
of the primary goals of the WPA was to provide a livable wage for the millions of 
unemployed workers of varying skill levels. Budgets and allocations for various WPA 
project units were based upon the “man-month” cost, or the average monthly salary for 
someone employed on a particular project. The wage structure was based upon three 
main criteria: geographical area, individual skill, and urbanization of county. The whole 
country was divided into four regions, in each of which wages were established in 
accordance with the cost and standard of living (McDonald 1969). As discussed before 
there were essentially four levels of classification for employees: professional and 
technical; skilled; semi-skilled; and unskilled. A standard rate of pay was set for each of 
these four classes in accordance with the geographic range.  
While the average man-month cost for Federal One varied from year to year, 
location to location, and project to project, it tended to have the highest figures when 
compared to other WPA projects, including other white-collar projects. For Fiscal year 
1937, the average man-month cost for all of Federal One was $99.80, whereas the 
average man-month cost for rest of the WPA that year was $59. Federal One was often 
criticized for the large disparity in its man-month costs compared to other projects. The 
main cause for the difference was due to the standardized rate of pay and the skill level 
of the employees on Federal One. In April, 1938, 8.6% of all Federal One workers were 
supervisory (and therefore often times not coming from the relief rolls); 67.3% were 
classified as professional/technical; 18.7% were skilled and/or semi-skilled; and only the 
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remaining 5.4% were considered to be unskilled (McDonald 1969). The majority of the 
workers on the other WPA projects fell into the semi- and unskilled categories and were 
therefore far less expensive. Additionally, many of the Federal One projects were 
concentrated in large metropolitan areas, which then also mandated higher wages 
(McDonald 1969). Table I examines the projected employment figures, and man-years 
as part of the requested allocation for Federal One made in July of 1938 for an eight 
month period. 
By the time that the WPA ended in 1942, it is estimated that it provided work 
and income for nearly 3 million people at a total cost of $11 billion (Grabell 2012). When 
compared to the overall total employment figures for all of the WPA projects, the arts 
projects of Federal One seem small. Due to the way in which employment records were 
kept and nature of the work performed by employees of Federal One it is difficult to 
pinpoint an exact number for the total number of people employed by the various Arts 
Projects. However, there are some figures available that look at a specific period of time 
to project estimates. According to researcher William McDonald, at its height the 
Federal One Arts Projects employed 2% of the total of WPA employees and towards the 
end of Federal One in 1939, there were as many as 2.6 million people working for the 
WPA. (McDonald 1969). This means that there were possibly as many as 52,000 people 
working on Federal One in May, 1939 (Quinn 2008). If that figure is used as an estimate 
for the entire four years of Federal One, possibly as many as 200,000 artists were 
employed by the federal government.1   
                                                          
1
 The 200,000 is based upon calculating out 2% of 2.6 million to get 52,000 for one year’s time of 
Federal One Employees. That 52,000 was multiplied by 4 to come to the 200,000.  
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Another way to estimate the total number of workers on Federal One is based 
upon an allocation request for an eight month period that was made in July of 1938, 
which is detailed in Table I. Federal One had a projected total employment of 39,600. If 
that figure was extrapolated out to a full year, at an estimated 4,950 total employees 
per month, it would come to about 59,400 workers. At that rate, as many as 237,000 
artists were employed by the federal government as part of Federal One for the four 
years it was in existence (McDonald 1969).2  Using these two different methods of 
estimation, Federal One Supported somewhere between 200,000 and 237,000 workers 
over a span of four years. 
It is important to note that in addition to the success of the WPA in regards to 
providing relief, there were artistic achievements that are a direct result of the program. 
Millions of new works ranging from musical scores, to paintings, to volumes of poetry 
were created. Additionally, countless Americans were granted the opportunity to 
participate in the arts, who may have not had the chance otherwise. Despite the 
bureaucracy that surrounded the Federal One arts projects, “few of the artists who 
worked on the WPA recall any bounds set to their artistic freedom” (Meltzer 1976). The 
various performing arts programs also performed in rural areas to expose new 
audiences to theatre, dance and live symphonic music; painters and sculptors created 
public works in many cities and towns throughout the United States to be enjoyed by all.  
There are several lasting project units of the Federal Music Project that are still 
providing jobs and producing music today. In 1933, there were less than a dozen 
                                                          
2
 The 237,000 estimate is based on the projections included in Table I for an eight month period 
of 39,600. That was divided by 8 to come up with the monthly estimate, which was then 
multiplied by 12 to result in an annual employment level estimate of 59,400. This figure was then 
multiplied by 4 to come to a total figure or 237,000.  
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recognized symphony orchestras in the United States but during the course of the WPA 
thirty-four more were added (Meltzer 1976). Many of these still exist including the 
Buffalo Philharmonic, the Pittsburgh Symphony, the Utah Symphony, and the Oklahoma 
City Symphony Orchestra (Zeigler 1994). The Federal Music Project brought symphonic 
music to many cities where it had not existed before and where no one had known 
there was a sustainable desire for it. Additionally, one of the other lasting effects of the 
Project was the new works that came out of it. Aaron Copland and Virgil Thomas were 
among some of the composers that worked for the Federal Music Project. The WPA also 
provided instructions for music teachers that gave them new techniques for teaching 
classes with several students rather than individual instruction, which up until this time 
was the norm. This expansion of education broadened the impact of the WPA 
(McDonald 1969).  
The Federal Art Project gave the American public thousands of new works of art: 
“the official record shows, there was over 100,000 easel paintings in oil, watercolor, 
tempera, and pastel; nearly 18,000 pieces of sculpture; about 2,500 murals; and some 
250,000 prints of over 11,000 original designs in the graphic media” (Meltzer 1976). One 
of the most notable achievements of the Art Project was the Index of American Design, 
the brainchild of Cahill. The purpose of the Index was to record American decorative, 
folk, and practical artistic design. It was intended to record material of “historical 
significance” that had not been previously studied and was at risk of being lost to form 
“the basis of an organic development of American design,” and to make these records 
“accessible to artists, designers, manufacturers, museums, libraries, and art schools” 
(Meltzer 1976). The Index of American Design on its own provided jobs for 500 people in 
35 different states at its peak (Meltzer 1976).  
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The achievements of Federal One also touched the technical aspects of the arts 
and several technological advancements were made. For example, electronic lighting 
boards with dimmer controls and backstage projections were two developments that 
came out of the Federal Theatre Project and revolutionized the way in which theatre 
and other live art forms are presented (Levy 1997; Mankin 1995). The ingenuity of 
several artists engaged in the Federal Arts Project produced new materials and methods 
such as, “two synthetic resins, alkyd and acrylic; a noncrackable sizing for canvas; a 
technique for painting directly on plastered walls by mixing a special glue with paint; 
and the petrochrome mural” (Meltzer 1976). During this same period, “improvements 
were made in color lithography and block printing… [and] the silk-screen process [was 
developed] into a fine arts medium” (Meltzer 1976). In fact, within a year of the first 
experiments, a fifth of all the Arts Project’s prints were created using the silk-screening 
process (Meltzer 1976). 
All of these successes were not enough to preserve Federal One indefinitely. 
Two programs were the source of the majority of the criticisms against the WPA: the 
Federal Writers Project and the Federal Theatre.  These two were also directly involved 
in the dissolution of the Arts Projects. Unlike most others, the Writers Project’s relief 
rolls were more open to non-artistic workers; essentially, any white-collar worker who 
could not find employment elsewhere within the WPA could be placed into the Writers 
Project. Unfortunately, this led to charges of abuse and fraud, especially when it was 
discovered that the Project had hired several individuals who had been convicted for 
check forgery. These counterfeiters claimed they had indeed “previously gained 
livelihood from writing fiction” (Levy 1997).  
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Additionally, charges of Communist ideology ran rampant in both the Federal 
Writers and Theatre Projects. The political and social commentary in a number of the 
writings and plays produced by these two projects led to accusations “of propagandizing 
Communist ideology, the Democratic Party’s agenda, and, specifically, Roosevelt’s New 
Deal” (Cooper 2004). During this same time, fear was mounting in the American public, 
and more importantly in the political arena, towards the threat of Communism. The 
Federal Government felt that in no way should it be supporting, much less funding, 
anything that appeared to promote Communistic ideals. Only a few short years after the 
Arts Projects were established, Congressman Martin Dies of Texas formed the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) in 1938 for the purpose of investigating 
charges of Communist infiltration.    
Just weeks after the formation of HUAC, it honed in on the Federal Writers and 
Theatre Projects. Out of the hundreds of plays produced by the Theatre Project, eighty-
one or nearly 10%, were criticized by the Committee and Congressional witnesses. 
HUAC claimed to have “startling evidence that Federal Theatre was operating as a 
branch to the Communist party” (Buttitta & Witham 1982). After months of testimony, 
the allegations against the two programs shifted to their use of federal funds. Hallie 
Flanagan, the National Director of the Federal Theatre Project, immediately produced 
documentation that the Project had begun charging admission for most plays in 1936 to 
help subsidize production costs and that tax-payer dollars were only being spent on 
relief wages. She was also forced to personally refute allegations of Communist 
connections and propaganda, but to no avail. Harry Hopkins and other high level officers 
within the WPA came to Flanagan’s defense and tried to protect the Federal One Arts 
Projects. Unfortunately, Representative Clifton Woodrum, chair of the House 
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Appropriations Committee, and his supporters in the House “moved swiftly” to 
introduce a bill that would cut off funding for the Federal Theatre Project (Buttitta & 
Witham 1982).  
In May of 1939, Colonel Francis Harrington, who had recently been appointed to 
replace Hopkins as Director of the WPA, came before the House Appropriations 
Committee with a new plan for the Federal One Arts Projects. He presented the 
committee with three major changes for the Program that he felt would “remedy 
certain defects” which included the idea of terminating the Federal One projects as 
federally sponsored endeavors , and securing local sponsorship for as many projects as 
possible (McDonald 1969). 
The Emergency Relief Act of 1939 called for the immediate abolishment of the 
Federal Theatre Project and gave only “one month to ‘liquidate’ property and non-
certified personnel and three months to ‘liquidate’ certified personnel” (McDonald 
1969).  It also put an end to federal support of the other four WPA sponsored Federal 
One Arts Projects by converting them into solely state projects. When the bill was 
brought before President Roosevelt “he called [it] discriminatory legislation to which he 
was personally opposed, but he signed” (Buttitta & Witham 1982). 
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COMPREHENSIVE EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ACT 
 
 
More than thirty years after the cancelation of the Federal One Arts Projects of 
the WPA, President Nixon signed into law the Comprehensive Employment and Training 
Act (CETA) in December, 1973. This new program provided job training and employment 
opportunities for those who were unemployed and underemployed. Unlike the WPA, 
CETA did not have a distinct program or objective to support out-of-work artists and arts 
administrators. However, there were a large number of unemployed artists who did 
qualify for employment through the program. CETA was intended to decentralize 
existing federally funded job support programs by giving power to state and local 
governments and agencies. The program lasted in this capacity until it was replaced by 
the Job Training Partnership Act in 1982.   
The late 1960s and early 1970s brought rapid changes to the labor market.  As 
the Baby Boomer generation was entering into the labor market it jumped by 16 million 
in about seven years, rising from more than 80 million in January, 1969 to 96 million in 
November, 1976. Alongside the spike in the labor force, employment shot up from 77 
million workers in December, 1968 to 88 million in December, 1976 (Department of 
Labor 1977). However, the unemployment levels were increasing along with the rise in 
employment and the labor force; between December 1968 and December 1976 
unemployment rose from a wartime low of 3.3% to 7.9% (Department of Labor 1977). 
To make matters worse, between 1969 and 1974 the rate of inflation more than 
doubled, jumping from 5.4% to 11% (Department of Labor 1977).  When CETA was 
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implemented in December of 1973 the unemployment level was relatively low hovering 
between 3 and 5% through the first half of 1974 (Dubin 1987; Department of Labor 
1975). As a result, the initial emphasis was on providing opportunities for those who 
faced long-term under- or unemployment rather than on those who more recently 
found themselves out of work. The major focus of the program was to “improve the 
employability of relatively untrained workers,” with an emphasis on disadvantaged 
populations, by both creating new job prospects and provide job training assistance 
(Dubin 1987).  
Soon after CETA went into effect, the economy took a rapid turn for the worse 
and unemployment quickly rose. By the end of 1974, unemployment hit 6.6% and 
skyrocketed for the next several months. By the second quarter of 1975, unemployment 
stood at about 9%, the highest it had been since the Great Depression (Department of 
Labor 1975). As the economy deteriorated, the goal of CETA was forced to change to 
provide support not only to those who were chronically under- and unemployed but to 
also provide assistance for those who recently lost their jobs. The idea was to create a 
counter-cyclical public service employment program, which would create temporary 
jobs in the public sector to “help the system regain a collective sense of balance” (Dubin 
1987).  
Between the time the WPA ended and CETA began, direct job support from the 
federal government had fallen out of favor. CETA was only the second of two programs 
since the Depression that provided relief through public service employment 
(Department of Labor 1977). The efficiency of public service employment was 
continually debated during the Nixon/Ford administration, specifically whether or not it 
30 
 
increased employment or if other expenditures or tax cuts resulted in better outcomes. 
There were also concerns over the potential for political problems created by scaling 
down public service employment after the economy improved (Department of Labor 
1977).   
One of the primary objectives of the Nixon/Ford administration was to establish 
“New Federalism,” a term to describe a new “working partnership between the Federal 
Government and the States and localities” (Department of Labor 1977).  It was based on 
the philosophy that decisions were better when they were made by those “directly 
concerned;” therefore the Federal Government should exist to support local levels and 
grant them more responsibilities and decision making powers in order to bring the 
“government closer to the people” (Department of Labor 1977). As a perfect example of 
New Federalism, CETA was the first national, decentralized employment and training 
program and was structured on the assumption that state, county, and city levels of 
government were better able to identify and design programs that addressed the 
manpower needs of their own communities (Department of Labor 1975). 
These local levels of government served as what was referred to as “prime 
sponsors” for the various projects that they oversaw; advisory boards and planning 
councils were created to provide guidance in the development and monitoring of 
programs and their outcomes (O’Leary & Eberts 2009). The legislation for CETA required 
that these planning councils include a fair representation of the community they served; 
this would include people who represented a variety of groups that had an interest in 
manpower policy decision. These groups included community and grassroots 
organizations, employment services, education and training institutions, businesses, and 
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agricultural groups.  There were no specifications from the Department of Labor on the 
percentage of representation by these groups on the advisory boards; those decisions 
were also left up to the elected officials’ discretion in the individual localities 
(Department of Labor 1975).  
Once a plan had been developed by a prime sponsor, it was the responsibility of 
the Secretary of Labor, and his or her staff, to review and approve the plans to ensure 
that they were in accordance with the guidelines set forth in the Act (Department of 
Labor 1975). Additionally, the Department of Labor was responsible for assessing the 
performance of CETA prime sponsors which focused on “three types of activities: 
reviewing compliance; assessing performance in relation to the goals in the approved 
plan; and evaluating program impact or effectiveness” (Department of Labor 1975).  
Federal funds were disbursed through large block grants to top elected official 
in each locality so that the local government could make the decision as to which 
programs and projects received funding. This was expected to reduce concerns about 
overlapping or duplicated allocations and allow for greater coordination with other 
agencies and departments in the community. Additionally, it created more flexibility and 
localized responses to the manpower needs in each locality (Department of Labor 1975). 
Funding was limited to local and state governments with populations over 100,000 
(Riojas 2006). The amount that each prime sponsor received was based on a formula 
that took into account the unemployment and income level of each locality (Barnes 
1975).   
CETA was broken down into seven titles in which a project could qualify for 
funding.  Title I was the largest of all the titles. It laid the background work for prime 
sponsors to provide manpower services, including training, employment, counseling, 
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testing, and placement (Department of Labor 1975). Title II was also among the larger of 
the qualifying titles. It authorized prime sponsors in areas with substantial 
unemployment levels (6.5% or higher) to develop transitional public service job 
opportunities (Department of Labor 1975). Title III allowed for a few specific national 
programs for which the Department of Labor served as the prime sponsor. These 
programs were administered by the Secretary of Labor. They included assistance for 
Native American groups, youth, and migrant and seasonal farmers, along with research 
and evaluation of CETA-sponsored projects (Department of Labor 1975). Title IV 
transitioned authority for the Jobs Corps program over to CETA; it had previously been 
authorized under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (Department of Labor 1975). 
Title V was different from all other titles as it provided for the National Commission for 
Manpower Policy to act as its own independent policy advisory group (Department of 
Labor 1975). Title VI was added to CETA by the Emergency Jobs and Unemployment 
Assistance Act of 1974, after the unemployment level peaked, and provided for 
emergency and temporary public service jobs; the purpose of this title was to ease the 
impact of the high unemployment rates (Department of Labor 1975). The seventh and 
final title of CETA did not provide for jobs or training programs itself but contained the 
“necessary definitions and administrative procedures to assist in the orderly 
management of the act” (Department of Labor 1975).  
The majority of the arts and cultural related programs received authorization 
Title II and Title VI, as they were intended to create public service jobs. Those who 
qualified for work on a CETA funded program, arts related or not, became an employee 
of the program’s prime sponsor, making them an employee of the state, county, or city 
government (Dubin 1987).  
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Beyond a program fitting into a specific title and money going directly to either 
salaries or expenses related to training programs, there were few limitations on what 
could be done with CETA funding. Each prime sponsor reserved the authority to decide 
which programs and projects it wanted to assign CETA funding to. Both public or 
governmental agencies and well as non-profit organizations were eligible to receive 
money from CETA to create new jobs or establish job training programs. 
 One of the major stipulations for a person to be eligible to be employed under 
CETA was that they had to be out of work for a minimum of thirty days. To be 
considered under-employed a person would need to be working fewer than ten hours 
per week or be making less than $30 a week (Dubin 1987). The time constraints for 
those unemployed workers were designed to discourage cities from laying off regular 
employees only to rehire them again with federal funds (Barnes 1975). The standards 
for eligibility were revised in 1974, the second year of CETA. The required period of 
under- or unemployment increased from thirty days to fifteen weeks. Eligibility was also 
determined according to federal income and poverty standards based on the person’s 
family size, which was $3,140 per year for an individual and then increased 
incrementally based on the number of family members (Dubin 1987). Additionally, 
prime sponsors and qualifying projects were to give preference to those on welfare and 
veterans of the Vietnam War. Salaries for those employed by CETA-sponsored programs 
were to be set at prevailing levels with a maximum of $10,000 annually (Department of 
Labor 1978). Agencies were also expected to try and find permanent positions for at 
least half of their CETA funded employees (Barnes 1975).   
The type of work that CETA sponsored, especially in the realm of public service, 
was quite varied as it was defined as, but not limited to:  
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work in such fields as environmental quality, health care, education, 
public safety, crime prevention and control, prison rehabilitation, 
transportation, recreation, maintenance of parks, streets and other 
public facilities, solid waste removal, pollution control, housing and 
neighborhood improvement, rural development, conservation, 
beautification, veterans outreach, and other fields of human 
betterment and community improvement (Barnes 1975). 
As a result, CETA-sponsored workers engaged in a wide variety of sub-professional 
positions such as teacher and library aides, traffic directors, crossing guards, and 
emergency telephone operators. In fact, at one point, half of all the zookeepers in New 
York City’s zoos were CETA trainees. This was a “controversial innovation which, 
nonetheless, enabled a troubled municipal service to continue” (Dubin 1987). 
As was mentioned before, prime sponsors had a great deal of flexibility in the 
types of jobs or programs they chose to support with CETA funds, several arts- and 
cultural-focused programs were chosen all throughout the country. In the beginning 
only a handful of arts programs were selected. As was the case with the WPA, the focus 
for CETA was providing work for those in need and not creating art. Unlike the WPA, the 
idea for support for the arts and artists did not come from Washington but started at 
the local level. 
The first arts-based program that qualified for CETA sponsorship was 
established in San Francisco around 1970, but did not receive CETA funding until 1974. 
Mission District Murals was a project of the San Francisco Art Commission’s 
Neighborhood Arts Program, which was funded with a small portion of the city’s hotel 
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tax revenues. It emerged from young Latino artists who had taken an interest in 
traditional mural techniques (Barnes 1975). In 1971, the city of San Francisco used 
surplus funding from the Supplemental Training and Employment Program to hire 
around a dozen muralists at $80 a week. Once those funds ran out, these muralists 
found themselves on their own again. As one artist described it, they thrived by “free-
lancing and free-loading;” this was a common feeling for many artists at the time 
(Barnes 1975).  
When CETA funding became available, the San Francisco Art Commission chose 
not only to fund the Mission District Murals project but many others under the 
Neighborhood Arts Program. In fact, the city poured more than 11% of its entire CETA 
budget into hiring artists of a variety of mediums including everything from muralists 
and filmmakers to playwrights and historians (Barnes 1975).3 Those employed with CETA 
funding would be given the civil service classification of ‘curatorial aides,’ paid $270 
biweekly, and put to work for at least six months (Barnes 1975). For the initial 113 jobs 
that were available, the Arts Commission received over 600 applicants, many of whom 
had advanced degrees and portfolios to match and had been “surviving on low-skill jobs, 
food stamps, unemployment or welfare” (Barnes 1975). After clearing an initial 
screening process, qualified candidates were interviewed by a committee that consisted 
of both Art Commission and manpower office employees. Beyond quality and talent as 
an artist the main criteria the Art Commission was looking for was an artist’s ability to 
communicate his or her skills to others. They were specifically seeking artists who could 
                                                          
3
 The total percentage of San Francisco’s CETA budge that went towards the Art Commission’s 
Neighborhood Arts Program was likely higher than 11 %. The exact amount is unknown because 
the source that sites this figure was written in 1975, recently after the project began receiving 
funding through CETA. Other sources were not able to provide a cumulative amount.  
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lead workshops and public performances, not just someone to work in a studio all day 
(Barnes 1975).  
The San Francisco Art Commission created a videotape documenting the work 
CETA artists were creating. This video was quickly and widely circulated. Many attribute 
the video and the work of the San Francisco Art Commission’s Neighborhood Arts 
Program to be the inspiration for subsequent programs in other cities (Dubin 1987). As a 
result, CETA administrators and prime sponsors began to realize that these arts 
programs were in line with the goals of CETA and soon more and more arts projects 
were requesting support. By 1979, the Department of Labor appointed a special CETA-
arts coordinator to assist in the monitoring and analysis of the arts programs. 
Additionally, two conferences were held in 1979 and 1980 to bring together the leaders 
of CETA-arts programs to share ideas. In 1979, the National Endowment for the Arts 
(NEA) was encouraging arts organizations to take advantage of the funding that was 
available to them through CETA.  In fact, the NEA included advice for arts organizations 
on how best to utilize these resources in a newsletter:  
It should be noted that prime sponsors have considerable authority and 
flexibility in the local interpretation of CETA rules. They cannot, 
however, be sensitive to the needs and peculiarities of arts groups 
unless these are specifically defined by the organizations themselves 
…You can play a significant role in determining how the rules are 
established for your own activities, and you should do so (Dubin 1987).  
The word quickly spread that funding to hire artists “was available and it was adaptable” 
(Dubin 1987: 17). Soon a variety of arts and cultural programs designed to put artists to 
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work improving their communities began cropping up all over the country (Barnes 
1975).  
Nearly sixty different non-profit arts- and community-based organizations 
received $2.4 million in CETA funds to support 284 arts- or cultural-related jobs in 
Chicago. On average each of these organizations were able to support between two and 
seven jobs with CETA funding (Dubin 1987). It is important to note that CETA funding 
only supported salaries and wages for workers. There was no funding available for 
supplies, materials, or to rent facilities. This meant that for artists to be able to create, 
the non-profit organizations and government agencies that the projects were housed 
under needed to use other funding to provide the artists with necessary materials.  
In Los Angeles, 71 people were hired for a CETA-sponsored theatre program 
that led to the creation of three acting companies, two dance companies, and a puppet 
company, all of which toured schools, hospitals, senior, and recreational centers. These 
six touring companies alone provided free performances to over 16,000 people 
(Department of Labor 1978). The Chicago Council on Fine Arts created an Artists-in-
Residence (AIR) program that lasted from 1978 to 1980, during which 108 artists in a 
variety of disciplines including dance, film, music, photography, theatre, graphic design, 
and administration were supported through CETA funding. This was one of the largest 
beneficiaries of arts-related CETA funding. As a Title VI project, AIR attempted to 
provide both countercyclical and structural assistance for unemployed artists by 
providing temporary employment to highly trained workers, thus addressing the 
counter-cyclical aspect, and addressed the structural concern by training the artists at 
the same time. AIR did not claim to develop these workers’ artistic skill but rather their 
ability to adapt and repackage their skills for “real market situations” (Dubin 1987). 
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Many artists were placed in various city agencies as program or production assistants 
that could easily be absorbed into permanent positions (Dubin 1987).  
Chicago’s AIR program also provided access to the arts in senior centers, 
schools, and child care facilities along with other institutions with limited access to 
similar resources (Dubin 1987). Unfortunately, when many of the artists left the 
program they took with them experience and new-found skills but found it difficult to 
find comparable jobs in the private sector (Dubin 1987).  
The desired end product of AIR and the majority of the other CETA-arts projects 
was the development of a new class of “cultural workers,” defined by CETA researcher 
Steven Dubin as:  
individuals with artistic training who had successfully learned to adapt 
their skills to the existing market, whose needs as workers could be 
seriously acknowledged as those of other occupational groups, and 
whose contributions to the health and welfare of local communities 
would be considered of value and thus worthy of continued support 
(Dubin 1987).  
Along with the creation of cultural workers, it was hoped that certain stereotypes and 
assumptions of artists as workers would decrease and therefore the number of 
opportunities would increase. Artists were frequently seen as “ascetic characters” who 
challenged “many of the accepted notions of what it means to be members of a 
professional group in this society” (Dubin 1987). A large majority of these artists 
underwent advanced training and reported stronger than average ties to their identity 
through their chosen profession. However, their rates of unemployment and income 
levels were drastically lower than other professionals with similar traits (Dubin 1987). All 
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too often, their uniqueness was emphasized while their similarities to other professions 
and groups were overlooked.  
As previously mentioned, the majority of the CETA arts programs were 
authorized under Title II and Title VI. Title II took a structural approach to those who 
faced long-term economic disadvantages while Title VI was intended to provide short-
term, countercyclical employment. The individual goals for both titles fit the needs of 
artists well. Many artists fell into the definition of structurally unemployed, since the 
number of positions available for artists, in artistic fields, were very limited and the 
number of individuals wanting or needing those jobs often exceeded the number of 
openings. Cyclical unemployment was often a challenge for artists as they frequently 
worked on either a commission basis or on projects that had definite endpoints. Artists 
also found themselves working short-term jobs outside their field to fill gaps between 
artistic projects (Dubin 1987). Additionally, the competition for these more marginal, 
non-artistic jobs tends to be more acute during harsh economic times (Dubin 1987).  
Many more artists might have been able to gain assistance through CETA 
employment if the time period of eligibility for under- or unemployment had not 
changed from thirty days to fifteen weeks in 1974. It was not uncommon for artists to 
find themselves out of work for thirty day stretches; however, due to low incomes it was 
nearly impossible for artists to go fifteen weeks without any kind of work to cover the 
most basic living expenses (Dubin 1987). The AIR Program in Chicago surveyed its CETA 
workers in 1979 and found that in the year prior to their employment with CETA only 
21% had been able to support themselves as artists and work outside the arts was 
required. Additionally, only 42% had ever been able to fully support themselves through 
their artistry alone at any time before being involved with CETA (Dubin 1987). When 
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asked what the biggest obstacle was in furthering their careers, respondents in all 
artistic disciplines stated the inability to find steady income for a substantial amount of 
time (Dubin 1987).   
There were some artists who were able to slip past the standards for eligibility. 
In a few cases it was discovered that artists between jobs were successful at gaining 
employment through CETA; it is also quite probable that these same issues were seen 
outside of the arts, too. Eventually, a stipulation was added that took the household 
income into consideration when determining eligibility of employment, rather than just 
the individuals’ (Dubin 1987).  
 In addition to meeting the standard qualifications for either unemployment or 
underemployment for work on a CETA sponsored project, artists were often required to 
have a specific level of talent or ability in their artistic medium. This was not the case 
with all CETA-arts programs, but many were able to petition for special dispensations 
from the Department of Labor that allowed for the administrators of a program to take 
talent and competency into account when hiring. Generally, the agency overseeing a 
CETA sponsored project would be given the files for the first three applicants meeting 
the eligibility requirements for a particular field. If the agency did not make a selection 
from those three individuals they would usually lose the position (Dubin 1987). Many 
CETA-arts programs were permitted to have artists review panels in which artists chose 
their own finalists for open positions. They argued that this review process was 
necessary due to the high level of competition for these jobs, and the panels were 
“essential to the selection process because the mechanical skills of artists are secondary 
to qualitative factors which require trained experts to distinguish” (Dubin 1987). As one 
administrator in New York put it, they were not “looking for the fastest artists, but 
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rather the best artists” (Dubin 1987). Candidates submitted portfolios of their work and 
written summaries of their prior experiences, media reviews, and personal statements. 
Generally, separate panels evaluated the work of artists of different disciplines (Dubin 
1987).  
These arts-specific programs, like all others supported by CETA, were not able to 
provide much in the way of promotions, rewards, or even job security – tenure simply 
did not exist under CETA. Artists, and most other CETA workers, knew not to expect to 
be employed on the project for more than one year.  Limitations were set on how long a 
CETA worker could be employed in order to discourage expectations that a project 
might continue indefinitely. This was thought to increase the number of people who 
were able to benefit from CETA; if a worker was eligible to stay on a project for a long-
term basis, it meant another would miss out on that opportunity (Dubin 1987).  In this 
case, after a year the original person would be replaced by someone new. Additionally, 
most projects were only funded on an annual basis to encourage the development of 
new activities to incorporate new workers (Dubin 1987). CETA employees could also be 
discharged from a project before their maximum time had been met. Sometimes this 
was due to a lack of need, skill, or other concern, but frequently, especially within the 
arts projects, it was because of their group assignment. Many of the performance-based 
projects involved ensemble work. Often times one member of the ensemble’s tenure 
might expire before the others (Dubin 1987). 
When developing CETA and giving administrative control to hundreds of state 
and local agencies, the federal government essentially failed to set any firm 
recordkeeping or reporting requirements; essentially, none of these agencies were held 
accountable for what was done with CETA funding (Riojas 2006).  Due to a lack of 
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regulations for reporting, it has been difficult for researchers to come up with exact 
figures for the total amount of funding that went towards CETA-art projects and the 
total number of individuals who were supported through these projects, much less for 
CETA as a whole. The records that do exist contain mostly raw placement figures and 
contain very little information regarding the experiences of the participants, long-term 
impacts, information on the types of jobs that were supported, or the effect the various 
programs and projects had on different industries (Riojas 2006). At the very beginning of 
CETA, sponsored programs were expected to report monthly to the Department of 
Labor, but it was soon decided that this was too burdensome for most and was phased 
out along with other requirements that resulted in “unnecessary paperwork” 
(Department of Labor 1975).  
There are existing estimates that by 1977 the federal government had spent 
nearly $40 million (approximately $148 million in today’s dollars) on arts related 
salaries, totaling nearly 0.5% of the program’s annual budget (Riojas 2006; Bureau of 
Labor Statistics). By 1979 over 10,000 artists and “related personnel” had been 
supported through CETA (Riojas 2006).  Other estimations indicate that by 1978, a total 
of $75 million (approximately $233 million in today’s dollars) was spent on positions for 
artists and supportive personnel, providing  approximately 7,500 jobs through 200 
different state and local government agencies (Department of Labor 1978; Bureau of 
Labor Statistics). In total, by the time the program ended, CETA allocations to arts 
organizations and projects were equal to “one-third those of the NEA” and hit levels of 
43 to 46% between 1977 and 1979 (Riojas 2006).  In 1980, when the NEA and the 
National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) were up for reauthorization it was 
revealed that CETA supported 600 arts-related projects in 200 locations and employed 
43 
 
approximately 10,000 artists and other cultural workers with an investment of $200 
million by the federal government (Riojas 2006). Congressional witnesses in support of 
the reauthorization attributed much of that success to CETA. Two titles provided the 
majority of funding for arts projects, Title II and Title VI. By 1978 these two titles 
accounted for more than 65% of all CETA jobs combined (Dubin 1987).  At the time of 
the first national CETA arts conference in 1979, the arts accounted for 2% of the public 
service positions under Title VI of CETA (Dubin 1987).  
Criticisms of CETA and its funding of arts projects were numerous. One of the 
biggest complaints against CETA was over the lack of recordkeeping. Almost every 
researcher in this study saw it as a major fault of the project because it made it very 
difficult for real assessments to be constructed. Individual prime sponsors may have 
required their qualifying projects to report back to them, but there were few, if any, 
reports sent back to the federal government. Allegations of fraud and abuse arose 
against the CETA funded arts projects, and several other non-arts projects, because of 
the lack of information available on those who were employed in these programs and 
their level of need at the time they were hired. Other critics were concerned that CETA 
workers may have been hired in governmental positions that could have “otherwise 
been funded by state or local monies,” in what some referred to as “substitution” 
(Riojas 2006). Additionally, there were complaints that some projects may have 
employed ineligible individuals or kept them on a project longer than the limits set by 
the legislation (Riojas 2006).  
Mismanagement of funds and improper supervision was also a common 
concern. One of the primary criticisms of the CETA-sponsored arts projects was simply 
over the question of why was the federal government was putting taxpayer dollars 
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towards the arts. One such critic of CETA questioned the validity of funding going 
towards the arts, stating that if CETA was going to fund a symphony why not an airline 
or a baseball team (Dubin 1987). Once again, the arts and artists were seen as frivolous 
and unworthy of federal relief.   
Regardless of how successful CETA was at providing jobs and new skills for 
workers, eliminating the program became a priority for newly elected Congress in 
November 1980; “organizational uncertainty was replaced by the certainty of 
dissolution” (Dubin 1987).The only question that remained was how long it would take. 
The majority of the public service employment programs under Titles II and VI were 
phased out beginning in the fall of 1981. The new shift in Washington led to a new 
taboo on public service employment and direct jobs support once again (O’Leary & 
Eberts 2009). In 1982, CETA was replaced by the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) 
which limited the choices for training to skills that were applicable to jobs that were in 
local demand. JTPA was able to increase partnerships between the public and private 
sectors by creating local advisory boards to ensure that business interests were 
represented (O’Leary & Eberts 2009).  
Between the funding received through CETA, the NEA, and a few other federal 
sources the late 1970s and early 1980s the arts received what was then considered to 
be unprecedented levels of support. In fact, between 1975, when the first art program 
received support through CETA, and 1992, funding for the NEA continued to rise 
steadily, reaching an all time high in 1992 with an allocation of over $175 million.4 While 
there does not appear to be any research to substantiate this, some of the additional 
support for the NEA received in the years following CETA could possibly be attributed to 
                                                          
4
 The NEA allocation grew every year with the exception of fiscal years 1982, 1983, and 1985 
which declined from the previous year.  
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the gains that were made through the placement of thousands of artists under CETA 
and a realization that cultural workers are significant contributors to the American 
workforce. 
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AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT 
 
 
In 2008 the United States was once again facing an economic crisis. The stock 
market had taken quite a hit, the housing industry had essentially fallen apart, and 
thousands soon found themselves unemployed. Between the start of the recession in 
December 2007 and October 2009 the number of unemployed workers increased from 
7.5 million to 15.7 million, raising the unemployment rate from 4.9 to 10.2% (O’Leary & 
Eberts 2009). Between October 2008 and October 2009 the newly filed unemployment 
claims averaged 577,000 per week. Two weeks prior to President Obama taking the oath 
of office, over 955,000 American workers filed new unemployment claims (O’Leary & 
Eberts 2009). The President knew he had to move quickly to stem the rising tide of 
unemployment.  
Only weeks after being sworn into office, Obama signed the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), which had three main goals: create new jobs and 
save existing ones; spur economic activity and invest in long-term growth; and foster 
unprecedented levels of accountability and transparency in government spending. ARRA 
intended to achieve those goals by: providing $288 billion in tax cuts and benefits for 
millions of working families and businesses; increasing federal funds for education, 
health care, and entitlement programs by $224 billion; making $275 billion available for 
federal contracts, grants and loans; and, requiring recipients of Recovery funds to report 
quarterly on how they used the money (Recovery and Transparency Board).  
Those who supported the bill saw it “as a vital lifeline for an economy heading 
toward a second Great Depression” (Wilson 2011). They touted the projections coming 
from the White House and other sources indicating that ARRA would create or save 
47 
 
around 3.5 million jobs in its first two years. However, it was certainly met with much 
resistance as well. Critics of the stimulus package claimed that it would “unduly swell 
the federal deficit while having minimal or even negative impact on employment and 
economic growth” (Wilson 2011). Now, nearing the close of the fourth year of ARRA the 
two sides still continue to argue about the effectiveness of the stimulus.  
As a result of the harsh economic times, non-profit arts organizations were 
struggling. Donations from individuals and corporations quickly declined and several 
organizations lost thousands or even millions of dollars on their investments. In 2009, 
organizations in New York City alone experienced over $93 million in realized losses on 
their investments and an additional $1 billion in unrealized losses (Jones 2012). At one 
point it was expected that possibly 10% of organizations might be forced to go out of 
business as because of the fallout from the recession (Nance 2009). Many of these arts 
organization were struggling to keep their doors open and were considering 
implementing layoffs or wage decreases to help make ends meet. As part of the $275 
billion in federal contracts, grants, and loans ARRA provided the NEA received an 
allocation of $50 million to be distributed through a competitive grant program to fund 
existing and create new jobs that would support the artistic mission of non-profit arts 
organizations.  
It was an incredibly difficult battle to get the NEA allocation into the bill, much 
less to keep it there. Only mere days after Obama took office, the House of 
Representatives and the Senate introduced bills for the new stimulus package. The 
House’s version was brought to the floor by Congressman David Obey of Wisconsin and 
included a specific provision blocking zoos and aquariums from receiving any funds from 
the bill. While zoos and aquariums do not typically receive funding from the NEA, many 
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consider them to be a part of the cultural industry as living museums or collections and 
they make up a significant portion of the non-profit sector. This bill was passed by the 
House with a 244-188 vote only two days later.  
The original Senate bill that was introduced by Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawaii 
did not include any prohibitive language related to zoos and aquariums. However, 
several restrictive amendments were debated. Senator Tom Coburn of Oklahoma soon 
announced his intention to bring forth an amendment that would not only prohibit zoos 
and aquariums from receiving funding, but also any “museum, theater, arts center, or 
highway beautification project, including renovation, remodeling, construction, salaries, 
furniture, zero-gravity chairs, big screen televisions, beautification, rotating pastel lights, 
and dry heat saunas” (American Alliance of Museums). While this exact amendment was 
never formally introduced and voted on, the day after this announcement Senator 
Cobrun introduced an amendment that did include language regarding  zoos, 
aquariums, museums, theaters, and art centers which was, unfortunately, adopted by 
the Senate in a 73-24 vote.  
Several conservative members of Congress voiced concern over what sort of 
activities might be funded if the NEA received an allocation from the bill. Representative 
Eric Cantor of Virginia tried to claim that of that $50 million, $300,000 would go towards 
a sculpture garden in Miami, which he proclaimed would not do anything to stimulate 
the economy and gave Congress free reign for pork barrel spending (Grunwald 2012). 
He was basing this claim on a grant the Vizcaya Museum and Gardens had received in 
the previous year to restore a portion of the gardens, and not on anything that actually 
appeared in the bill (PolitiFact.com). Additionally, Cantor was concerned that at that 
time there were no specific guidelines as to how the NEA should spend the money. 
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Others in Congress reared back to defend the allocations to the arts. Representative 
Obey’s spokeswoman Kristin Brost was quoted as saying, “artists need jobs just like 
everyone else. $50 million out of $825 billion doesn’t seem like an extreme amount to 
support our artists” (PolitiFact.com).  
As a result of the conflicts and the added amendments, the NEA no longer 
expected to receive any funding from ARRA (Stage Directions 2009). Advocacy 
organizations such as Americans for the Arts and the Performing Arts Alliance engaged 
several activists and advocates and set out on campaigns to educate the public and 
members of Congress on the importance of the including funding for the arts in the 
recovery effort. During this time period, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi reportedly 
received a phone call from Robert Redford, one of her favorite actors, asking her to help 
retain funding for the arts in the bill (Grunwald 2012). The two different versions of the 
stimulus bill were resolved by the House-Senate conference committee, during which 
time the limitations on museums, theaters, and art centers were removed but the 
provisions against providing funding for zoos and aquariums remained intact. After the 
bill passed, Americans for the Arts shared a statement on its website thanking various 
leaders on Capitol Hill who “carried [their] voices into the conference negotiation room 
and throughout the halls of Congress” and worked to make the case for the arts, the 
value of “protecting jobs in the creative sector,” and their impact on the economy 
(Stage Directions 2009). Ironically, President Obama signed the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act into law on February 17th at the Denver Museum of Nature and 
Science (American Alliance of Museums).  
The final inclusion of the NEA allocation in the Act reads as follows: 
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For an additional amount for ‘‘Grants and Administration’’, 
$50,000,000, to be distributed in direct grants to fund arts projects and 
activities which preserve jobs in the non-profit arts sector threatened by 
declines in philanthropic and other support during the current economic 
downturn: Provided, That 40 percent of such funds shall be distributed 
to State arts agencies and regional arts organizations in a manner 
similar to the agency’s current practice and 60 percent of such funds 
shall be for competitively selected arts projects and activities according 
to sections 2 and 5(c) of the National Foundation on the Arts and 
Humanities Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 951, 954(c)): Provided further, That 
matching requirements under section 5(e) of such Act shall be waived 
(U.S. Congress). 
According to Victoria Hunter, Communications Director for the NEA at the time, the 
funds received through ARRA were “intended to be timely, temporary, and targeted - 
timely in that [they were] meeting an immediate need; temporary in that this [was] 
bridge funding; and targeted in that organizations who've applied [were] making the 
case that these funds will have a specific purpose, preserving a specific job” and were 
“designed to help organizations over a hump, and tide them over until a time when, 
ideally, things get a little better or circumstances change” (Nance 2009).   
There were two ways in which a worker in an arts organization could be 
supported through ARRA: full or partial salary support for one or more positions that 
were “critical to an organization’s artistic mission” which had either been eliminated or 
were in jeopardy due to the economic climate; and/or “fees for previously engaged 
artists and/or contractual personnel to maintain or expand the period during which such 
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persons would be engaged” (National Endowment for the Arts 2009a). In addition to the 
typical details included in a grant application, the narrative portion of the application 
included basic information such as the job title and description, along with the salary 
and anticipated number of weeks of employment  or a description of the artists or 
contract personnel, the project they would be working on, the fees associated with 
those positions, and the number of weeks of employment regarding each position for 
which the organization was requesting assistance (National Endowment for the Arts 
2009b). Organizations were also asked to describe a position’s significance to the 
mission of the organization and the anticipated effects if curtailed or eliminated. 
Organizations were permitted to apply for funding for essentially any position as long as 
they were able to justify its importance in supporting the artistic mission. However, 
fundraising and development positions were strictly prohibited from qualifying for 
assistance. It should be noted that with the rare exception of a few grant programs the 
NEA does not typically provide funding for individual artists. Therefore, individual artists 
were not permitted to apply for funding from ARRA. 
When reviewing the applications, the NEA grant panelists were given specific 
guidelines for evaluating an application. The main criteria were the “artistic excellence 
and artistic merit of the project” which also took into consideration:  
quality of the organization; potential of the project to have a significant 
and immediate impact on the arts work force; significance of the project 
and position(s) to the mission and core work of the organization; 
…ability to carry out the project including the appropriateness of the 
budget, the quality and clarity of the project goals and design, the 
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resources involved, and the qualification of the project’s personnel 
(National Endowment for the Arts, 3). 
The NEA, and other federal agencies, were required to collect information about the 
projects they funded in order to track the outcomes of activities to report back to 
Congress. This particular grant program had the following outcome: “organizations 
enhance their ability to realize their artistic and public service goals” (National 
Endowment for the Arts 2009a). Panelists were also asked to evaluate an applicant’s 
ability to achieve this outcome and the feasibility of meeting reporting requirements to 
prove the outcome was met. Applicants were asked to explain exactly what they 
intended to achieve, how they would measure their level of success, and at the end of 
the grant period how they would determine what was learned from their success or 
failure.  
Organizations that were awarded ARRA funded grants from any source were 
required to report on the use of funds quarterly. They were to report to both the agency 
from which they received the grant and to the Recovery Accountability and 
Transparency Board, which was created through ARRA legislation, via the Recovery.gov 
website. This website was designed specifically to allow taxpayers to track how and 
where ARRA funds were spent. As mentioned before, transparency was a significant 
factor in the overall design of the act and all ARRA grant, contract, and loan recipients 
were required to use the Recovery.gov website’s reporting features.  
The NEA recognized the urgency to get the money out the door and into the 
hands of the organizations in need; for many organizations this funding was a matter of 
being able to carry on, having to drastically cut programs, or even worse, shut their 
doors. The organizations that were hurting the most were already operating on limited 
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budgets; for them to be able to receive funds that would directly support salaries made 
it possible for them to keep their staff and redirect other funds in order to continue 
providing programs to their communities. The NEA moved quickly to disperse funds to 
the arts organizations. In less than a month they had already approved grants for the 
first 40% of the money. The NEA was among the first government agencies to allocate 
its ARRA funds.  
The NEA provided over 700 direct grants to non-profit arts and cultural 
organizations, totaling 60% of the $50 million allocation (National Endowment for the 
Arts 2012). Direct grants to arts organizations from the NEA were given at two levels: 
$50,000 or $25,000. Additionally, the remaining 40% was given to state and local arts 
agencies in all 50 states and the District of Columbia as well as regional arts 
organizations, including Arts Midwest, Mid Atlantic Arts Foundation, Mid-American Arts 
Alliance, New England Foundation for the Arts, South Arts, Western States Arts 
Foundation, to be re-granted. In total, through ARRA the NEA provided over 1,100 
grants to support jobs in the arts (Recovery & Transparency Board). Re-grants of the 
remaining 40% from regional arts organizations and State Arts Agencies varied from 
agency to agency as each one had the liberty to set their own guidelines. The grant 
period was intended to last for a maximum of one year, however some grantees were 
able to extend projects longer and there are a handful that are continuing to expend 
funds from ARRA more than three years later.  
To date, ARRA has awarded over $241 billion in grants, contracts, and loans.5 
The portion of this total amount that the NEA received adds up to 0.02% of all grants, 
                                                          
5
 As of September 25, 2012. 
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contracts, and loans or 0.0006% of the entire $840 billion for all ARRA expenditures, 
including tax benefits and entitlements. Out of the $50 million the NEA was allocated 
from ARRA, it paid out $49,981,306 in grants to 1,112 arts and cultural organizations in 
all fifty states; on average each grantee received approximately $45,000 (Recovery & 
Transparency Board). The remaining $18,694 was used by the NEA to cover the 
administrative expenses such as “costs associated with panels and travel, contractual 
support… [for] Information Technologies operations, and staffing” (Recovery & 
Transparency Board).  Originally, the NEA had budgeted to spend $500,000 on these 
administrative expenses, but the agency was actually able to spend significantly less.  As 
a result, over 5,140 full time equivalency jobs (FTE) were supported or preserved 
through ARRA and the NEA over a two year period.6 Among those 5,140 jobs supported 
were three actors in a production of Richard III at Chicago’s Shakespeare Theatre; an 
additional week’s salaries for all of the actors in the new work Little House on the 
Prairie: The Musical based on the works of Laura Ingalls Wilder at the Paper Mill 
Playhouse in Millburn, New Jersey; the designer of a Cezanne exhibit at the Montclair 
Art Museum also in New Jersey; an administrative assistant and a web marketing 
consultant for the Jazz Bakery Performance Space in Los Angeles; the production 
manager for the Southwest Chamber Music Society also in Los Angeles; and many 
others (Grabell 2012; Los Angeles County Arts Commission).  
                                                          
6
 It must be noted that this figure is for full time equivalency (FTEs) jobs and does not count the 
total number of individuals who benefited from this program, in fact significantly more than 
5,000 people may have benefited since FTEs are based on the number of hours that a person 
worked compared to that of a full time person (40 hours per week, for an entire year). 
Organizations were only permitted to record the time that a supported worker was spending on 
the particular project for which they received funding. Frequently, workers in the arts industry 
spend their time on several projects and activities in a single day, so it is very likely that the 
number of people supported would be much higher than 5,143.   
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As was foreshadowed by the difficulty getting the allocation for the NEA into the 
bill in the first place, there was a great deal of criticism from politicians and the media 
once it was in place. Funding for the NEA has come under scrutiny since its formation in 
1965 and especially since the Culture Wars of the 1990s. One of the most common 
criticisms towards federal funding for the arts is that it is frivolous, a sentiment 
commonly heard during the WPA and CETA eras as well. In the case of ARRA, many felt 
that it was more important to invest in building infrastructure, leaving artists and their 
advocates to defend their need to feed their families and pay their mortgages (Grabell 
2012).  
Senator Coburn’s attack on the arts, for example, did not stop after the bill was 
passed; harkening back to the days of the WPA he was concerned about funds 
supporting Communist sympathizers and pointed specifically to In the Heart of the Beast 
Puppet and Mask Theatre in Minneapolis, Minnesota which received $25,000 in ARRA 
funds. The organization takes its name from a popular Che Guevara quote and produces 
an annual Mayday parade featuring artists who are openly against “free market 
fundamentalism” (Grabell 2012). The conservative cable news channel Fox News also 
criticized the grant a film society in San Francisco received that had recently screed the 
movie Thundercrack which was described as “the world’s only underground kinky art 
porno horror film, complete with four men, three women, and a gorilla,” and a dance 
company that performed in the nude (Grabell 2012). In both of these instances, the 
organizations in question did not receive funding to support these projects directly, but 
rather for administrative salary support.  
The media and politicians were not the only ones voicing their opinions against 
the NEA during this time. In fact, there was a great deal of criticism coming from within 
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the non-profit arts industry and arts advocates as well. The majority of these criticisms 
focused on the structure and the requirements of the grant program itself. In the 
interest of expediting the allocation of the funds, the NEA placed a stipulation that all 
direct grant applicants must have received a grant from the NEA within the past three 
years.7 Robert Lynch, President and CEO of American for the Arts, stated that this rule 
limited “the pool of eligible applicants, and there are a hundred thousand arts 
organizations out there, all of whom need help” (Williams 2009).  Nina Ozlu Tunceli, the 
General Counsel of Government and Public Affairs with Americans for the Arts, noted 
how difficult it is for an organization to compete for and receive a grant from the NEA 
and that the majority of the organizations that are successful in doing so are generally 
the major institutions (Williams 2009).   
The NEA defended its eligibility guidelines, suggested by the Office of 
Management and Budget, which still allowed for about three thousand arts 
organizations to be eligible for ARRA grants. Additionally, groups that had not received 
NEA funding in the past four years were eligible for stimulus money through regional, 
state, and local arts agency sub-granting programs (Nance 2009). The requirements 
were intended to streamline the application and review process, but no matter how 
hard the NEA fought to have people understand this, the limitations surrounding the 
direct grants were not widely supported.  
However, arts organizations were not ungrateful for the funds that were 
available to them. Leaders of these organizations knew that $25,000 or $50,000 may not 
be enough to save an entire season, but it was an excellent opportunity to invest in 
other areas such as bolstering a marketing department or extending the run of a 
                                                          
7
 A direct grant refers to those who received funds from the NEA and not through a re-grant from 
another organization or agency. 
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promising production (Williams 2009). On the other hand, these grants could be 
transformative for other organizations or at the very least to the lives of individuals. 
Tree Swinson of the Academy of American Poets stated that “$25,000 [could] make the 
difference between retaining someone who is barely able to earn a salary and that 
person’s having to go get a job elsewhere” (Nance 2009).  
At the beginning of the recession in 2008 there was a great deal of concern over 
how the arts industry would fare and if it would be able to recover from the financial 
losses. Many organizations were worried about fulfilling their artistic missions with 
diminished resources, especially in regards to their staff and other workers. If it were 
not for the NEA and a multitude of arts advocates it is very likely that the arts industry 
may not have seen any funding from ARRA, and at the very least the structure of the 
program might have been different. Hopefully, the outcomes of this allocation to the 
arts will be great enough to encourage policy makers to recognize the importance of the 
arts on the economy and workforce.  
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FINDINGS 
 
 
The intention of this study was to examine the way in which the WPA, CETA and 
ARRA supported jobs in the arts in order to inform future polices. The original 
hypothesis for this study presumed that it would be possible to identify specific 
attributes of each program that should or should not be repeated. However, this has 
proved to be more difficult than expected, mainly because each program was designed 
to meet the specific economic, political, and social needs of the time and provide relief 
for workers that faced different problems. Beyond providing funding to support artists 
and other workers in the arts industry they had very little in common. The conditions 
under which each program was created will never replicate themselves and therefore a 
new approach must be taken with any future policy to meet current needs. Rather than 
specifically declare one program as the victor or definitively state how policy should be 
shaped in the future, this paper will present key comparison points for all three 
programs that should be considered if the country ever found itself in need of a job 
support program that would include the arts.  
It was difficult to compare all three programs and to make a determination as to 
which elements of the programs may have been better than the others for several 
reasons. One of the main issues is the inability to make direct cause and effect 
relationships between particular elements of the programs and the outcomes. For 
example, there is not a conclusive way to determine if workers becoming employees of 
the federal government under the WPA, becoming employees of state and local 
governments in a program like CETA, or remaining employed by individual arts 
organizations under ARRA resulted in higher or lower employment levels or more 
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efficient programs. This again reflects back to the notion that a variety of external issues 
defined these programs and each was designed to support jobs in the arts in very 
different ways.  
Another issue is the lack of records for the WPA and CETA. The figures that exist 
for budgets and the number of people supported by both of these programs are only 
estimates. Hard and fast numbers simply do not exist. Fortunately, for ARRA there are 
very precise numbers available but they are almost incomparable to the other two 
programs because they are FTE figures rather than counting individual people or jobs. 
Due to the lack of records, it is difficult to see the long term effects of the WPA and 
CETA, which may have been helpful in this analysis. Both of these earlier two programs 
created arts organizations and projects that continue to this day, which have resulted in 
decades of job opportunities for cultural workers. However, with the exception of a few 
personal stories it is hard to say what happened to the individuals who were supported 
by these programs after they ended. There is also a similar issue with ARRA, but here 
the problem is that this program was too recent to really be able to determine any long 
term effects.8 It is worth noting that all three of these programs were intended to 
provide short term relief until the economy improved or individuals were able to find 
unsubsidized work. It was not the intention of any of these programs to support 
individuals for a long period of time, so the long term effects may not be significant. 
When looking at the outcomes of all three programs, the WPA supported 
somewhere between an estimated 200,000 to 237,000 jobs over a four year period of 
time with total expenses of $160 million ($2.7 billion when adjusted for inflation); CETA 
                                                          
8
 Because there are details about what organizations received funding and to support which jobs, 
it would be possible to survey the organizations that received grants to find out if the supported 
position has been able to continue after the grant program ended.  
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supported an estimated 10,000 plus jobs over seven years, spending $200 million ($506 
million when adjusted for inflation). Finally, ARRA supported over 5,140 FTE jobs over 
two years (two-thirds of which were supported in the first year only) with expenditures 
of $50 million (Bureau of Labor Statistics). If the numbers of jobs supported for each 
program is broken down to an average on an annual basis, the WPA supported 50,000, 
CETA 1,430, and ARRA 2,570.9 On a per job basis, the federal government spent on 
average about $1,135 for each of the 200,000 supported under the WPA, $20,000 for 
the 10,000 CETA employees, and $9700 for the 5,140 ARRA supported FTE jobs.10  
If these quantitative outcomes were the only thing taken into consideration, it 
would appear as though the WPA was the most successful of all three programs due to 
the high volume of jobs it supported and the low cost per job. CETA would appear to be 
the least successful; it was the longest running program at seven years and created 
10,000 jobs, only twice that of ARRA in two years or twenty times fewer jobs than the 
WPA in four years. Finally, ARRA would appear to fall somewhere in the middle. In fact, 
if the level of support for the first year of ARRA had been sustained it could have 
supported as many as 13,600 jobs in four years (the length of the WPA) or 23,800 in 
seven years (the length of CETA). Therefore, if only looking at the numbers it would be 
easiest to say that in order to maximize the number of jobs supported in the arts the 
federal government should just repeat the policies of the Federal One Arts Projects of 
the WPA. Unfortunately, the numbers do not tell the whole story and the structure and 
                                                          
9
  The WPA figures were based on the conservative estimate of 200,000 total jobs. ARRA actually 
supported 3,436 jobs in the first year and the remaining 1,707 over in the subsequent years. 
10
 From available documents, it is known that the average annual salary for a Federal One 
employee was approximately $1,135 in 1938 (McDonald 1969). However, the rates for 
employees generally increased from one year to the next due to inflation. So the average wage 
over all fours years would be different. The estimate used for CETA and ARRA here are based 
upon the total number of jobs supported divided by the total dollar amount that went towards 
jobs in the arts. The majority of the workers under CETA and the WPA were only supported for 
one year.  
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design of each program must be taken into consideration beyond the number of jobs 
supported.  
All of the varying elements of each program are detailed throughout the paper 
and included in Table II and Table III. Table II includes details of each program such as 
the years in effect, the number of jobs supported, the unemployment rate when the 
legislation took effect, and the budgets for all three. Table III serves as a basic 
representation of main points of comparisons between all three programs to show 
where and how they were different or similar in structure and support for the arts. 
These main comparisons points or trends that were discovered in all three programs 
serve as the basis for the recommendations and consideration points for future policies.  
As has been demonstrated, each of the three programs were structured in such 
a way that was based upon the politics, economy, society of the period. It is highly 
unlikely that any of these programs could ever be exactly replicated and supported by 
Washington or the general population, because of the ever evolving society we live in. 
However, there are certainly elements of each program that could be incorporated 
again in future programs. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
The following two recommendations should be included in any future job 
support or stimulus program that will provide assistance for the arts. These are based 
upon observed trends in the WPA, CETA, and ARRA as well as contemporary practices in 
legislation. While the political climate is constantly in flux, it is unlikely that a desire for 
clear legislation and transparency will change anytime in the near future.  
ARTS INCLUDED IN LEGISLATION: In order to have good, informed policy of 
any kind having detailed legislation is vitally important. Therefore, future legislation will 
need to clearly state how the support of the arts would be structured.  This would 
include who is eligible to receive support, who has the authority to make decisions, and 
many other elements that will be identified as consideration points for legislators later 
in this study.  
This, like many other elements, differed in all three of the past programs. The 
arts were not specifically included in any portion of CETA legislation; prime sponsors 
chose to support arts projects because they felt that the arts fell into the domain of 
public service and served the needs of their community. By not including the arts or 
defining exactly what activities CETA funding could support, beyond strictly salaries, the 
individual prime sponsors were granted a significant amount of freedom in deciding 
what they deemed to be appropriate. This high level of flexibility in conjunction with a 
lack of record keeping makes in incredibly difficult to evaluate the effect that CETA had 
on supporting workers in the arts.  
On the other hand, the executive order that shaped the WPA and the legislation 
for ARRA both included detailed information on how the arts would be supported. The 
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formation and structure of the five discipline-specific Federal One Arts Projects was 
clearly laid out along with detailed information on what types of activities could be 
supported, defining how artists or workers were eligible for support, how the funds 
could be used, and much more. However, because the funding structure for the WPA 
and Federal One was not secured though the Executive Order but rather a series of 
Congressional appropriations it was vulnerable and left workers and project 
administrators uncertain at times.  Even though there is little in the way of records for 
the number of people who were supported through Federal One, there is extensive 
information available on the projects that resulted.  
 For ARRA, the inclusion of the arts in the act was not nearly as detailed as it was 
in the WPA but it did give guidelines for how the funds should be disbursed - 60% 
directly to arts organizations by the NEA and 40% to specific re-granting agencies. It also 
stated that the funds were to be given to non-profit arts organization, not individual 
artists, and should be done so following the guidelines set forth in the founding 
legislation for the NEA, the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965 
and its subsequent amendments. For ARRA, this reference to the Arts and Humanities 
Act of 1965 provided the definition of art and artists and provided guidelines for what 
organizations were eligible. For both the WPA and ARRA, because there was clearly 
defined language on what types of projects or organization could be supported and 
definitions of what constitutes an artist there were more limitations on these two 
programs than what was seen with CETA.  
Without legislation to clearly define how the money can and cannot be used 
there is too much room for ambiguity. And where there is ambiguity there are too many 
opportunities for abuse and fraudulent uses of the funds. This is not just applicable to 
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the arts of course, but for any particular group or industry that is intended to receive 
funding from a federal job support or economic stimulus program.  
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS: As part of the legislation, guidelines should be 
set for all funding recipients to keep uniform records of how the money is being spent, 
both inside and outside of the arts. This recommendation is mainly based on the current 
political climate and the desire for transparency from the American public. Additionally, 
requiring solid records is simply good policy. It allows for the federal government to 
evaluate the outcomes of investments more clearly and to track where the money is 
going. Without reporting requirements it makes it nearly impossible to evaluate the 
effects of a program. 
As noted before, one of the limitations in evaluating both the WPA and CETA is 
the lack of records. Neither one of these programs required the governing agencies to 
keep records of the number of people who were supported nor how exactly funds were 
being spent. To counter this, record keeping was one of the major advantages in 
evaluating ARRA because all grant recipients, not just the arts portions, were 
contractually obligated to report to the federal government using a website that was 
designed specifically for these reporting measures. It would be impossible to say that 
record keeping, or the lack thereof, had any direct effect on the level of support and 
how many individuals benefited. This requirement for ARRA did force grant recipients to 
be accountable for the funds and increased transparency within the federal 
government, one of the key tenants of the act. 
The requirement for keeping records should also be clearly outlined in the 
legislation. However, there are many points that policy makers would need to consider 
regarding this requirement. Processes and guidelines would need to be established. 
65 
 
Depending upon on the way in which the program was structured, legislators would also 
need to consider who the recipients report back to: a particular department or agency 
within the federal government, to a state or local agency, or to some other entity 
altogether? They would also need to decide the frequency or time frame in which the 
reports must be submitted. Policymakers should also specify if reports would be 
designed to collect information on the number of people and/or positions that were 
supported, full time equivalents, or a combination of both. Also, it should be decided if 
the records should be made publicly available so that others could conduct additional 
research and evaluations. 
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POINTS TO CONSIDER 
 
 
The following points highlight the differences in the structure of each program 
and present options for legislators to consider. The research on the WPA, CETA, and 
ARRA did not definitively prove the direct effects of each element and therefore 
recommending a particular approach is not possible at this time. However, each of these 
elements of structure represents important pieces of each program and the way in 
which it supported the arts. The recommendation is that all of these points and options 
be considered by legislators when crafting future policies. The outcomes of these 
decisions should be detailed in the legislation in order to define the structure and design 
of how the arts are to be supported, as noted earlier.   
OVERALL PROGRAM STRUCTURE: One of the first points to considered is 
the way in which the program would be structured, specifically: how funds would be 
disbursed, who would be responsible for the oversight of the funds, and who would 
manage those employed through the program. Regardless of the decision on the 
structure, it would also need to be decided if this choice would only apply to the arts-
specific portion or, if applicable, to all other non-arts related portions as well. The WPA, 
CETA, and ARRA all took very different approaches to the structure and design of the 
program.  
The most centralized of all three programs was the WPA; all aspects were 
controlled by some level of federal government. The WPA was not just a piece of 
legislation but an entire federal agency. As noted before, every decision about the WPA 
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and Federal One Arts Projects was made by someone who worked for the federal 
government and everyone who was employed through the WPA was on the federal 
government’s payroll. It was also the responsibility of the Federal One administration to 
do the hiring and firing of employees. In this sense, the WPA acted as a direct job 
support program and there was no middleman involved at any point. For all of the 
Federal One projects, the decisions about the individual project units that would be 
produced or created were made by someone with in the administration of each 
discipline-specific project. The project units were also designed around the available 
talent in a specific area. Project units were managed at a local, regional, and/or state 
level, but this was done by someone employed by the federal government.  
The WPA as a whole, not just the Federal One Arts Projects, was structured this 
way. For the first and only time in US history, everyone from high level administrators to 
construction workers to piccolo players that were supported by funds from the WPA 
were employed by the federal government, who was also responsible for all oversight of 
the programs. If the WPA administration learned of a project or activities it did not 
approve of they had the authority to pull funds and terminate the program. Because the 
WPA arts programs were “administered at the national level, the products of the 
component WPA parts… reflected on the political party dominating national offices” 
(Dubin 1987). As a result it was the federal government’s duty and responsibility to 
defend any type of politically or morally offensive work. Concerns over the type of work 
that was being completed by the Federal Theatre and the Federal Writers projects led to 
the dismantling of all the Federal One projects in 1939, three years before the WPA as a 
whole ended.  
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CETA, on the other hand was specifically designed to be a de-centralized 
program and therefore quite opposite in structure from the WPA. All CETA funds were 
handed down from the federal government to prime sponsors, the top level of 
government in various states, counties, and cities with populations greater than 
100,000. It was the responsibility of the prime sponsor to choose what programs would 
be supported with CETA funding. With the exception of a few national programs that 
the federal government managed (none of which were arts or culture related), all 
decisions, management and oversight for CETA projects was handled by the local prime 
sponsors. Qualifying projects were managed and housed under both public and 
governmental agencies and non-profit arts and community based organizations in 
localities. Regardless of whether or not the project was run by a government agency or 
a non-profit organization the workers were placed on the prime sponsor’s payroll. The 
prime sponsors held the authority to make the hiring decisions; although the agency or 
organization that the project was housed under was sometimes permitted to have input 
in the hiring process, this varied from prime sponsor to prime sponsor. As a result, the 
prime sponsors were responsible for all oversight of the projects and to evaluate the use 
of funds. However, if the federal government did learn of improper or inappropriate use 
of funds they did have the authority to tell the prime sponsor to end that project or 
activity, but this was very rare, especially for the arts projects.  
Due to the fact that CETA was locally administered, it allowed for more broadly 
conceived notions of what was and was not appropriate work to be funded by the 
government. The art that was created by CETA sponsored projects and artists often 
done so to appeal to the local tastes. Additionally, there was immediacy between the 
administration of the qualifying program and the prime sponsor, which actually allowed 
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for more oversight of the work as it was in process. This frequently allowed for prime 
sponsors to indentify problematic projects in the development stages so that alterations 
and changes could before it was too late. Prime sponsors under CETA were able to use 
more subtle and systematic levels of control to monitor the activities of qualifying 
projects and direct their work and make modifications when needed (Dubin 1987). 
ARRA was in some ways a hybrid of the WPA and CETA as far as the 
centralization of the program is concerned. Sixty percent of the funds that went to arts 
organizations came directly through the federal government via the NEA, while the 
remaining 40% were controlled by state and local arts agencies and regional arts 
organizations. That 40% was then re-granted to arts organizations in the state, local, and 
regional agencies’ jurisdiction. All workers whose salaries were supported with ARRA 
funding remained employees or contractors of the organization and were paid by the 
organization, unlike the other two programs in which the workers became employees 
and were paid by some level of government. As ARRA was designed to support 
particular positions within an organization, the organization then had the authority to 
place any person into that position regardless of their level of need. As a result, the arts 
organizations themselves were then directly responsible for managing the work of the 
supported employees.  
The decision regarding exactly what projects or positions would be supported 
was essentially made by both the organization and the granting agency. Arts 
organizations were required to specifically state what jobs would be supported through 
the grant and why this position was important to continuing the mission of the 
organization in their grant application. The granting agency then made the ultimate 
choice on which organization would receive support. If an organization was chosen as a 
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grant recipient it was contractually bound to only use the funding to support the salary 
of the particular positions included in the grant application. Regardless of which 
granting agency provided the organization with the grant, organizations were required 
to report back to the federal government quarterly for the duration of the grant period 
on their use of funds. Additionally, many of the other non-federal granting agencies also 
required the recipients to report back to them as well as the federal government. The 
reporting requirement then allowed the federal government to have oversight on all 
grant recipients. If an organization was discovered to be using the grant money 
improperly they were at risk of having their funding revoked by the granting agency, at 
which point it would be returned to the federal government.  
The structure of all three programs was also influenced by the way in which the 
arts received their funding. All three of the programs depending on appropriations from 
Congress, but the way in which they received them was rather different. The WPA was 
so centralized in the federal government that all projects, both arts- and non-arts 
related alike, made direct requests for funding to President Roosevelt. He then, in turn, 
made a recommendation to Congress. Appropriations for the WPA were made 
intermittently, usually for three to six month period. Under CETA, the individual prime 
sponsors would work request funding from the Secretary of Labor usually on an annual 
basis for the duration of the program. Each prime sponsor could use their discretion on 
what portion of those funds would go towards the arts. On the other hand, ARRA 
awarded the NEA a one-time-only direct appropriation.  
DEFINING ARTS, ARTISTS, AND ELIGIBILITY: When developing the 
legislation, policy makers will need to clearly define what is meant by the “arts;” more 
specifically what types of workers or organizations would be eligible. It would also need 
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to be decided whether or not the program would support individual artists that may or 
may not associated with a particular organization, program, or agency, if funds would go 
to arts organizations, or a combination of both.  
None of the legislation for the three programs studied took on the responsibility 
of defining the word “art.” The WPA was broken down into the five discipline specific 
projects; it was essentially up to the directors of each project to decide what fell within 
their jurisdiction. Because the arts were not even mentioned in the legislation for CETA, 
there was clearly no definition on which prime sponsors could base their decisions, and 
even the definition of “public service” was somewhat subjective as well. Since ARRA’s 
funding provided salary support for a position that was critical to supporting the 
organization’s artistic mission it also did not need to define the arts specifically, but 
rather what constitutes an arts organization. This definition was not included in ARRA 
legislation but is stipulated in National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 
1965. 
Each of the three programs took different approaches in determining what 
kinds of workers were eligible for support. The WPA funded individuals exclusively. For 
particular disciplines such as the Music Project, the Theater Project, and the Dance 
Project where artists frequently worked in ensembles it created project units that 
resembled other non- and for-profit arts organizations. Federal One created many 
symphonies, touring companies, and groups that became non-profit arts organizations 
when the WPA ended; many of them exist to this day. Unfortunately, these ensembles 
and professional level productions were often in direct competition with unsubsidized 
non-profit and for profit arts organizations and companies. Since the WPA the total 
number of non-profit arts organizations has grown exponentially. Creating new 
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government-run or sponsored programs and ensembles would only increase the 
completion with existing arts and cultural non-profit organizations. It is important to 
note again that the WPA was prior to the existence of the NEA and at that time it was 
extremely rare for an arts organization to receive any support from the federal 
government.  
CETA funded individuals, all of whom were connected to a particular project or 
program within a government agency or non-profit organization. Funding for ARRA went 
exclusively to non-profit arts organizations to support the salary and wages of various 
employees and contract workers; individuals alone were not eligible to apply for 
funding.  
If at least a portion of the funds were in a future program to be given to arts 
organizations, legislators would need to decide if only artists (meaning those directly 
involved in the creation, production, or presentation of art) would be supported, or if 
administrative workers such as fundraising, marketing, or managerial staff could also 
benefit. All three programs allowed for both types of workers to be supported. 
However, due to different circumstances there are indications that the WPA and CETA 
tended to support more artists and creative workers that ARRA may have supported a 
greater of a mix of artists and administrative personnel.  
Related to defining what types of workers would be eligible for support, 
legislators must also consider whether or not the program would support only 
individuals who were either under- or unemployed by creating new opportunities if it 
would support existing jobs that were threatened in some way. In the past, all three 
programs supported workers of varying levels of need. The WPA Federal One Arts 
Projects only provided assistance for unemployed workers that met very specific criteria 
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to be included on relief rolls with the United States Employment Services. CETA 
provided assistance for workers who were both under- and unemployed for a specific 
amount of time. ARRA supported positions that were either recently eliminated or 
jeopardized existing ones.  
Many of the CETA-arts projects were permitted by their prime sponsor to take 
talent and skill into consideration when hiring. This allowed for them to pick from the 
qualified workers and select the artists that best suited the needs and goals of each 
project. The programs of Federal One essentially had no choice but to hire everyone on 
the relief rosters that claimed to be an artist, regardless of their talent level. The various 
projects in each locality were based upon the available talent, rather than seeking out 
the talent to fit a particular project as CETA was permitted to do. However, they were 
permitted to hire a maximum of 25% non-relief workers for their skills in areas that 
lacked adequate talent to produce quality work. Additionally, an artist who proved to 
have minimal talent could be transferred to a different non-Federal One WPA project, if 
there was an opening. In the future, legislators should also determine whether or not 
artistic talent would be a qualifier for an individual to receive support.  
ARRA was quite different from the other two programs in that the focus was 
less on the person and their eligibility requirements and more on the organization and 
its needs. Funding from ARRA was to support positions within organizations that were 
either already eliminated, at risk of being eliminated, or positions whose salary was 
significantly reduced. During ARRA, organizations also had the opportunity to create 
new positions, but this was not the primary focus of the program. As mentioned before, 
the individual organizations then had the autonomy to hire whomever they would like 
to fill these positions regardless of that individual’s personal needs.  
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LIMITATIONS ON WAGES: Based upon how the overall program is structured, 
policy makers would also need to determine if limitations would be set on wages. Since 
the WPA and CETA were both direct job support programs, in which workers were 
placed on the government’s payroll, there were clear minimums and maximums for 
wages.  
WPA employees were all assigned one of four classifications: professional or 
technical, skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled. Their classification, the kind of work they 
were engaged, and their geographic region would dictate their salary. In most cases, 
workers were expected to put in at least ninety hours of work per month. Additionally, 
once hired most artists were required to work during specific hours and given a certain 
allotment of time in which a work of art must be completed. For many other types of 
workers setting deadlines or giving time constraints was not a difficult request but it 
often conflicted with the creative process.  
By law the WPA and the federal government was required to cover the salaries 
of all relief workers and no additional subsidizes were permitted. There was a slight 
exception to this rule for the small percentage of workers on the Federal One Arts 
Projects that did not qualify for relief. Funding for these salaries could come from co-
operating sponsors, if a project unit had one, or from the admission revenue of the 
Federal Theatre and Music projects. Under the WPA, if an employee had even been as 
much as offered a job somewhere in the private sector they were required to quit the 
WPA and take the other position. Additionally, if it were discovered that an employee 
received any additional income either in the form of investments, aid from family or 
friends, or practically any other source there were frequently considered ineligible for 
support.  
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Wages under CETA were fixed, but it was up to each prime sponsor to decide 
what that limit would be. The main stipulation on the wage level was that it had to be 
set a prevailing and livable level for the location and was not to exceed $10,000 
($45,000 when adjusted for inflation) annually (Bureau of Labor Statistics). CETA 
followed many of the same rules as the WPA, however not nearly as strictly. In fact, in 
the early days of CETA, a worker’s total household income as not taken into 
consideration for eligibility and many workers were supported who may have otherwise 
been able to thrive. Later on the eligibility requirements became more stringent. 
Regardless, if a worker was offered an unsubsidized position they were encouraged to 
take it, but they were not forced to do so. It was also acceptable for workers to have 
additional sources of income. However, the agency or organization that the employee 
worked for was not permitted to supplement their wages in any way and all funding for 
a CETA employee was only to be funded through federal funds received by the prime 
sponsor.  
ARRA was quite different from the other two programs. Again, there were no 
eligibility requirements for the individual whose salary was supported. Therefore, the 
person who filled an ARRA grant funded position could have a second job, have income 
off of investments, or have family and friends who were willing to help provide financial 
support. Additionally, the organizations that received the grants were permitted to 
supplement the salary or wage for the funded positions through other means as well. 
Essentially, 100% of the ARRA funds had to go towards the proscribed positions; those 
funds did not have to make up 100% of the salary of those positions.  
SUPPORT FOR SUPPLIES: In addition to making decisions regarding 
limitations on wages, legislators must also decide if funding would be available for 
76 
 
supplies and facilities. In order to create and produce art, painters must have canvases 
and paints, musicians must have instruments and sheet music, sculptors need clay and 
metal, and dancers need rehearsal space and costumes. Additionally, if funding is 
supporting wages for administrators it might be worth considering if funds could go 
towards supplies and other things that they might need. For example, if an organization 
received support for its marketing director would it also be permitted to use funds to 
print and send out postcards or purchase a large poster for a bus shelter?  
While the WPA’s focus was on providing work for artists, administrators 
recognized that additional funding was needed in order for them to actually produce 
anything. As a result, the WPA provided money for supplies, materials, and space for 
artists to create, develop ideas, perform, and present their artwork. CETA and ARRA, on 
the other hand, did not allow for funding to go towards anything except salary support. 
This meant in order for workers to do the work they were hired to do, the program was 
required to find money to purchase supplies and other supporting equipment 
elsewhere. For most of its grant programs, the NEA requires organizations to secure 
matching funds, but for ARRA grants this requirement was waved. This has become a 
common trend in philanthropy in recent years and might be worth considering if 
matching funds should be a requirement of any future programs.  
Though there does not appear to be any evidence to support this claim, it does 
seems likely that for both of the two more recent programs there may have been 
projects or organizations that either did not compete for funding or were denied 
support because they were not able to secure the money necessary to purchase the 
materials needed to actually put artists or administrators to work. If funds could have 
been spent for these types of items there is a possibility that more projects and workers 
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would have benefited from these two programs. However, the opposite side of this 
argument would be that making funds available for supplies has the potential to reduce 
the amount available to salaries and then either reduce the wages or number of people 
who would benefit. 
DURATION OF SUPPORT: One of the final points to consider that would need 
to be considered is the length of time the program would be in effect and how long 
workers would be eligible to receive assistance. Again, all three programs had different 
approaches to providing relief for artists and arts organizations and each one was 
created in during times of varying degrees of economic hardship.  
From the onset, the WPA as a whole, and more specifically the Federal One Arts 
Projects, was intended to last indefinitely or at least until the economy improved and 
the private sector was better capable of supporting the workforce. However, there was 
no knowing when that day might come and therefore no time limits were set in place.  
In 1939, three years before the WPA was canceled, the Federal Theatre Project and the 
Federal Writers Projects were terminated and the remaining projects were transitioned 
into state run operations. The choice to make these changes was based on changing 
political ideology and allegations of communist activities among those receiving relief. 
Additionally, there was no time limit for how long an individual could be employed 
through the WPA and there were probably several workers, artists and non-artists alike, 
who may have worked on a WPA project from the beginning of the program until its 
end.  
CETA as a whole, much like the WPA, was intended to also last indefinitely, or at 
least until conditions improved. However, the individual public service projects and 
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workers that were funded through Titles II and VI, as were the majority of the arts 
related projects, faced very specific time limits for how long they could be supported. 
Workers were only eligible to receive assistance from CETA for one year and many of 
the projects were designed to only last for that one year. Projects or prime sponsors 
who were discovered to be supporting workers longer than one year were subject to 
consequences. CETA was phased out in 1981 as a result of a changing political climate 
that no longer favored direct job support programs.    
There was also not any specific time frame given to ARRA legislation as a whole; 
this is partially due to the fact that it was not entirely a job support program but also 
included tax cuts and benefits and changes to entitlement programs. All of the grants, 
contacts, and loans, constituting the bulk of the job supporting efforts were structured 
differently; some had time limits and others did not. The majority of those programs or 
projects that did have time limits were self-imposed by the agency that received the 
contract or loan or administered the grants; this was the case for the grants that came 
through the NEA. The grant program using the ARRA funds was intended to limit 
support to approximately one year. However, some organizations used the funds faster 
and some used them more slowly. The last of the grants was disbursed in 2010, and as 
of June, 2012 there was still at least one organization that was using a part of the 
funding to support one or more jobs.11  
 
                                                          
11
 At the end of the second quarter of 2012, there was a 0.61 FTE jobs reported to Recovery.gov 
under the National Endowment for the Arts’ allocation.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The Federal One Arts Projects of the Works Progress Administration, the 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973, and the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 did prove to be very different federal job support programs. 
Collectively, these three programs supported nearly 300,000 arts and cultural workers in 
three different decades and economic crises. Each one had a unique approach to 
providing work for struggling artists. Much can be learned from the way in which these 
programs were structured. Based upon the findings from researching the WPA, CETA, 
and ARRA, should America find itself in need of another job support program that would 
provide assistance for the arts, legislators should ensure that arts and the structure of 
its support are included in the legislation and that they require records to be kept on the 
use of funds and the number of workers supported. Additionally, policy makers should 
consider the structure of each of the previous programs when designing new legislation. 
They will need to make decisions on how the arts will be defined, what kinds of workers 
or organizations would be eligible for support, if there will be limitations set on a 
supported workers’ salary or wage, if funds would be permitted to go towards supplies 
in order to create art, and, finally, how long workers and organizations would be 
allowed to receive assistance.  While looking to the future, policy makers may also want 
to look at the long term effects of these past programs and how workers were able 
support themselves after the program ended. There may also be other models used in 
other industries or in previous job support programs that did not provide assistance for 
the arts that could be adapted for the arts.  
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Hopefully, as America continues to recover from the most recent recession it 
will find itself in a long period of prosperity. However, if the economy was to falter again 
and federal legislators were to enact a new job support program it should provide 
assistance for the arts industry. Policymakers should feel confident in learning from the 
lessons and examples set forth in previous policies to continue to grow and strengthen 
the arts in America. As different as all three of these program were, there were two 
common but contradictory threads between them all: supporters of the programs 
believed that all artists and cultural workers are just as worthy as any other worker of 
support; and those who criticized the program often argued that supporting the arts, 
and thus artists, was frivolous in a time of need. As American politics and society 
continue to evolve hopefully more and more people will be begin to agree that artists 
deserve the opportunity to be provided with a livable wage so they can continue to 
contribute to the cultural heritage that makes this country so great.  
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TABLE I 
 
 
Requested Allocation for the Federal One Arts Projects For an Eight-Month 
Period Starting June 1938 (Source: McDonald 1969) 
Project Employment Man-Year 
Cost 
Man-Month 
Cost12 
Requested 
Amount 
Federal Art 
Project 
4,900 $1,225 $102 $4,001,667 
Federal Music 
Project 
11,500 $1,135 $95 $8,701,667 
Federal Theatre 
Project 
10,500 $1,248 $104 $8,736,000 
Federal Writers 
Project 
4,600 $1,135 $95 $3,480,667 
Historical Records 
Survey 
8,100 $943 $78 $5,092,200 
Total for Federal 
One 
39,600 $1,137 $95 $30,012,201 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 Man-month costs were not part of the original chart as presented by McDonald in his text. This 
column was added by the author in order to show the man-month cost and to keep consistent 
with the way in which wages were presented in the preceding text.  
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TABLE II 
 
 
Comparative Program Information 
 WPA CETA13 ARRA 
Years in Effect 1935 – 1942 1972 – 1981 2009 – present 
Years Supporting 
the Arts 
1935 – 1939 1974 – 1981 2009 – 2010 
No. of Arts Jobs 
Supported 
200,000 10,000 5,143 
No. of Arts Jobs 
Supported 
Annually14 
50,000 1,430 2,570 
Total No. of Jobs 
Supported 
3,000,000 U/K15 5,960,000 
Percent of All Jobs 7% U/K 0.008% 
Unemployment 
Rate16 
20.7% 5.0% 8.3% 
Arts Budget $160,000,000 $200,000,000 $50,000,000 
Cost per Arts Job $1,135 $20,000 $9,700 
Arts Budget 
(adjusted for 
inflation) 
$2,651,844,592 $506,884,480 $53,692,135 
Total Program 
Budget 
$11 Billion U/K $840 Billion 
Total Budget 
(adjusted for 
inflation) 
$155 Trillion U/K $840 Billion 
Percent of Budget 1.5% U/K 0.0006% 
                                                          
13
 As noted before, all numbers that are available for CETA are estimates and there are no solid 
numbers readily available to researchers. To date, no conclusive figures for the total number of 
jobs supported through CETA outside of just the arts projects nor the total budget have been 
located.  
14
 These figures are approximate based on the total number of jobs in the arts supported and the 
number of years each program supported the arts 
15
 U/K: Unknown due to a lack of records for CETA.  
16
 This is the unemployment rate when the legislation went into effect. Source: Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
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TABLE III 
 
 
Program Structural Details 
 WPA CETA ARRA 
Arts included in 
legislation  
Yes No Yes 
Arts funded 
through 
Federal government 
directly 
Block grants to 
State & Local 
Government (Prime 
Sponsors) 
Grants from NEA 
and re-granting 
agencies 
Authority for 
project decisions 
Federal One 
Administration 
Prime Sponsors Arts NPOs/Granting 
agency 
Authority for hiring Federal One 
Administration 
Prime Sponsors Non-profit Arts 
Organizations 
Employees 
managed by 
Federal Government Prime Sponsors Non-profit arts 
organizations 
Government 
Oversight 
Federal State & Local Federal, State, 
and/or Local 
Reporting 
Required 
No No Yes 
Relief for Unemployed only Under- & 
Unemployed 
Existing, at-risk and 
new jobs 
Length of aid to 
workers 
Indefinitely One year One Year 
Limitations on 
wages 
Yes Yes No 
Money available 
for supplies 
Yes No No 
Legislation starting 
point 
President (Executive 
Order) 
Congress to 
President 
President to 
Congress 
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